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An Exercise in Sound Discretion: Old Chief v. United States
Since the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1973
by the Supreme Court and their subsequent adoption by Congress in
1975,1 courts have struggled with the application of the various rules.
Although many of these rules have presented difficulties in their
application, Rule 403 has perhaps caused the greatest uncertainty.2
Regardless of whether this confusion results from the ambiguity in its
terms, the discretion it affords to the trial judge, or the balancing
process it necessitates,3 Rule 403 is part of a code intended to
promote truth and fairness in the judicial process Generally
characterized as a rule granting judicial flexibility to aid in the
achievement of these goals' Rule 403 primarily serves as a guide for
situations in which no other specific rules control
Noted as the foundation of the Federal Rules of Evidence,7 Rule
1. See Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. app. (1994)). See generally Edward W. Cleary, Preliminary Notes on Reading
the Rules of Evidence, 57 NEB. L. REv. 908,913-14 (1978) (discussing the promulgation of
the Federal Rules of Evidence).
2. See, eg., Stephen A. Saltzburg, A Special Aspect of Relevance: Countering
Negative Inferences Associated with the Absence of Evidence, 66 CAL. L. REv. 1011, 1017
(1978) ("The dispute over the proper approach to rule 403 balancing questions has never
been resolved.").
3. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 states: "Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EviD.
403.
4. See FED. R. EVID. 102. Rule 102 describes the goal of the Federal Rules of
Evidence as being "to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable
expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to
the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined." Id.; see
also Jon R. Waltz, Judicial Discretion in the Admission of Evidence Under the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 1097, 1098 (1985) (noting a "high, if somewhat
vague, purpose" intended by the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence).
5. See Thomas M. Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 74 IowA L. RFv. 413,414 (1989); see also infra notes 113-21 and accompanying
text (discussing the various views about the policy behind Rule 403).
6. See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note (recognizing that under the case
law, some situations require the "exclusion of evidence which is of unquestioned
relevance"); see also infra note 119 and accompanying text (noting the drafter's intent and
the description in the Advisory Committee's Note).
7. See Victor J. Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on the Nature of
Unfairly Prejudicial Evidence, 58 WASH. L. REV. 497, 497 (1983) (noting the importance
of Rule 403 as a means to control the admissibility of evidence in a system that favors
admission); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of Probative Value and Prejudice in
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403 presents a balancing test for trial courts to apply when deciding
whether to exclude certain evidence.8 After determining initial
relevancy and admissibility under Rules 401 and 402,9 the trial court
must then exercise its soundest discretion in ruling on whether to
exclude the evidence under Rule 403.10 Reasons for excluding under
Rule 403 include the "danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury," and "considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." 11
While trial courts receive criticism for the lack of precision in their
decisions under Rule 403,12 most commentators nevertheless realize
that the drafters intended for trial judges to have flexibility in their
application of the rule.1
Recognizing the uncertainty enshrouding the entire rule and its
applicability in cases coming before the federal courts of appeals, the
Supreme Court recently resolved an unsettled application of Rule
403 in the context of criminal trials involving felons in possession of
firearms.14 In Old Chief v. United States,'5 the petitioner, Old Chief,
was a defendant charged as a felon in possession of firearms under
Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Can Rule 403 Be Used to Resurrect the Common Law of
Evidence?, 41 VAND. L. REV. 879, 905-06 (1988) (describing Rule 403 as "a cornerstone
of the Federal Rules [of Evidence]"); Waltz, supra note 4, at 1110 (identifying Rule 403 as
"one of the most, if not the most important of the Federal Rules of Evidence").
8. See FED. R. EVID. 403; supra note 3 (quoting FED. R. EviD. 403).
9. Federal Rule of Evidence 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED.
R. Evri. 401. Rule 402 states: "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or
by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority.
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." FED. R. EVID. 402.
10. See Andrew K. Dolan, Rule 403: The Prejudice Rule in Evidence, 49 S. CAL. L.
REV. 220,230-31 (1976).
11. FED. R. EVID. 403; see also supra note 3 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 403).
12. See 22 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5223, at 317-18 (1978). A trial judge's
explanation of the ruling would "help to avoid knee-jerk responses" and would also help
counsel to understand the application of the rules. 22 id, at 318.
13. See, e.g., 22 id § 5212, at 251. Professors Wright and Graham note that even
though Rule 403 does not use the word "discretion," it nevertheless almost undoubtedly
confers discretionary power on the trial judge. See 22 id.; see also Mengler, supra note 5,
at 414-15 (noting that the drafters intentionally built flexibility into the Federal Rules of
Evidence); Waltz, supra note 4, at 1098-99 (describing the flexibility intentionally built
into the Federal Rules of Evidence); infra notes 108-12 and accompanying text (discussing
the drafters' intent behind Rule 403).
14. See Old Chief v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 644,649,655-56 (1997); Infra notes 122-
39 and accompanying text (detailing cases from the federal courts of appeals that applied
Rule 403 in the context of cases arising under the federal felon-in-possession statute).
15. 117 S. Ct. 644 (1997).
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title 18, § 922(g)(1) of the United State Code. 6 He asserted that
under Rule 403 the potential danger of unfair prejudice required the
prosecution to accept his offer to stipulate to his prior conviction as a
felon.17 However, the prosecution refused to accept the stipulation,
arguing that the long-standing rule that permits the prosecution to
choose the evidence it will use to present its case justified its refusal.'8
The Supreme Court recognized the prosecution's reasoning but
accepted Old Chief's argument because the general rule advocated
by the prosecution has no application when a defendant's legal status
is at issue." Thus, in a five-to-four decision, the Court held that the
district court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence the full
record of Old Chief's prior conviction 0  Because the name and
nature of the prior conviction as contained in the record may have
led the jury to improper considerations as a basis for its conclusions,
and because the only purpose of the evidence was to prove the fact of
prior conviction, the Court ruled that the trial court should not have
admitted the evidence under Rule 403.21
This Note discusses the facts of Old Chief, its history in the lower
courts, and the Supreme Court's resolution of the issues presented by
the case35 The Note then reviews the background of Rule 403 2 as
well as the historical controversy in the federal appeals courts
surrounding the appropriate application of the rule, particularly in
the context of criminal cases involving offers of stipulation by the
defense.24 Next, the Note discusses Old Chiefs impact on Rule 4035
It then considers the policy behind the prosecution's unwillingness to
stipulate and the possible motivation of the Court in its holding on
evidentiary issues in cases involving the felon-in-possession statute.
26
16. See id at 647. The statute penalizes persons convicted of a crime punishable by a
term of imprisonment exceeding one year if such persons possess or receive a firearm
shipped in interstate commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1994); see also infra note 28
(quoting § 922(g)(1)).
17. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 648.
18. See id. at 653; see also Parr v. United States, 255 F.2d 86, 88 (5th Cir. 1958)
(stating that the reason for the rule is to allow a party" 'to present to the jury a picture of
the events relied upon. To substitute for such a picture a naked admission might have the
effect to rob the evidence of much of its fair and legitimate weight.'" (quoting Dunning v.
Maine Cent. Ry. Co., 39 A. 352,356 (Me. 1897))).
19. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 654.
20. See id. at 655.
21. See id. at 647,655.
22. See infra notes 28-105 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 106-21 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 122-39 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 140-239 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 240-60 and accompanying text.
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Finally, the Note examines the potential effects of the Court's
holding.
Johnny Lynn Old Chief was charged with violating title 18,
§ 922(g)(1) of the United States Code, which prohibits felons from
possessing firearms.O He was also charged with using or carrying a
firearm during the commission of a violent crime and assault with a
dangerous weapon.2 9 The charges arose out of Old Chief's
involvement in a brawl on an Indian reservation during which
someone fired at least one gunshot.30 Prior to trial, Old Chief
requested a court order prohibiting the prosecution from introducing
evidence of a prior conviction for assault causing serious bodily
injury.' Asserting that the name and nature of his prior conviction
would prejudice the jury to such an extent that the prosecution would
not be held to its requisite burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt,32 Old Chief offered instead to stipulate to the fact of his prior
conviction.33 He therefore requested the court to instruct the jury
that he had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment of
more than one year, rather than disclosing specifically that he had
been convicted of assault causing serious bodily injury.3
27. See infra notes 261-70 and accompanying text.
28. The statute makes it a crime for anyone "who has been convicted in any court of,
[sic] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year... [to] possess in
or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or
ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce."
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1994). Section 921(a)(20) identifies certain crimes not included in
the term "crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" as
(A) any Federal or State offenses pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade
practices, restraints of trade, or other similar offenses relating to the regulation
of business practices, or
(B) any State offense classified by the laws of the State as a misdemeanor and
punishable by a term of imprisomnent of two years or less.
Ma § 921(a)(20). The statute further notes that "[w]hat constitutes a conviction of such a
crime shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the
proceedings were held." Id.
29. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 647.
30. See id.
31. See iU at 647-48. Specifically, Old Chief requested that the prosecution abstain
from mentioning his previous felony conviction during jury selection, in the opening
statement, or in the closing argument, and from offering the testimony of any witnesses
concerning the details of his criminal record. See iU
32. See U at 648.
33. See i&
34. See iU Old Chief also proposed a jury instruction that purported to define the
meaning of a "crime punishable by one year." See id However, the proposed instruction
failed to clarify whether Old Chief's conviction was as a matter of law within the given
definition or was instead a mere statement of fact from which the jurors could not
determine if the prior crime fell within the stated exceptions. See id. at 648 n.2. Because
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Furthermore, Old Chief supported his claim by arguing that his offer
to stipulate the fact of his prior conviction made the name and nature
of his prior conviction inadmissible under Rule 403 because the
danger of unfair prejudice likely to result from its admission
substantially outweighed the probative value of the evidence.35
The prosecution firmly opposed the stipulation, arguing that in
accordance with the general rule granting prosecutorial discretion it
had the right to choose which evidence it would use to prove the
elements of the charge.36 Agreeing with the prosecution, the trial
court refused to apply Rule 403 to exclude the detailed evidence of
Old Chief's prior conviction,37 and, in an oral ruling, declared that the
prosecution did not have to accept the stipulation.38 The trial court
thus permitted the prosecution to introduce into evidence the order
of judgment and commitment for Old Chiefs prior assault
conviction? 9 In addition, the trial court allowed the prosecution to
read the order of judgment and commitment for Old Chief's prior
conviction, disclosing unequivocally to the jury that on December 18,
1988, Old Chief assaulted and caused serious bodily injury to another
person and was sentenced to five years in prison. °  The jury
thereafter found Old Chief guilty on all three counts, and he
subsequently appealed 1
In an unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial
court by briefly noting that even though Old Chief offered to
the trial court denied Old Chiefs motion on the basis of the general rule that permits the
prosecution to choose its own evidence, Old Chief's defective instructions were
insignificant. See icL
Even though Old Chiefs erroneous instructions were not used, the jury nevertheless
received defective instructions. See U The trial court wrongfully directed the jury that it
could consider the prior-conviction evidence only as it affected the defendant's credibility
as a witness, when in fact Old Chief never testified at trial. See id. However, the Court
blamed Old Chief as much as the prosecution for the error in the jury instructions:
Although Old Chief had initially asked the court to instruct the jury not to consider his
prior conviction for impeachment purposes, he later withdrew his request after the trial
court charged the jury. See id.
35. See id at 648.
36. See iU Old Chief also contended that the prosecution's refusal to accept his
stipulation amounted to prosecutorial misconduct because a prosecutor's duty requires
"the pursuit of just convictions, not victory by fair means or foul." Id. at 650 n.5.
However, the Court determined that any ethical duty was dependent on Rule 403's
construction and that it had no reason to expect ethical misconduct once the meaning of
the rule was decided. See iU
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stipulate, the prosecution had the right to prove the prior felony
conviction element by using probative evidence.42 Furthermore, the
court stated that a stipulation was not proof under Ninth Circuit
law,43 and therefore it had no function in the balancing process under
Rule 403.4 The court also distinguished Old Chief's case from its
holding in United States v. Hernandez,45 in which it held that a
defendant's stipulation to the prior felony conviction satisfies the
prior-conviction element of § 922(g)(1). 46 The court stated that its
holding in Hernandez did not mean that the prosecution must always
accept a defendant's proposed stipulation as proof of the prior-
conviction element.47 Therefore, the court held that the trial court
had not abused its discretion by permitting the prosecution to admit
evidence of the name and nature of Old Chief's prior conviction.48
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to resolve the
division among the courts of appeals in their treatment of cases in
which a defendant attempts to exclude evidence of the name and
nature of a prior conviction under circumstances similar to Old
Chief49 The Court noted that the name and nature of the prior
crime, particularly assault causing serious bodily injury, increased the
chance of conviction in the later trial.' Therefore, it held that the
district court had abused its discretion by refusing Old Chief's offer
42. See United States v. Old Chief, 56 F.3d 75 (table decision), No. 94-30277, 1995
WL 325745, at *1 (9th Cir. May 31,1995), ree'd, 117 S. Ct. 644 (1997).
43. See M
44. See id.
45. 27 F.3d 1403 (9th Cir. 1994).
46. See i. at 1408.
47. See Old Chief, 1995 WL 325745, at *2.
48. Seeid.
49. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 649. Compare, e.g., United States v. Breitkreutz, 8
F.3d 688, 690-92 (9th Cir. 1993) (acknowledging the prosecution's right to reject a
defendant's proposed stipulation and to use its own evidence of the prior conviction),
United States v. Burkhart, 545 F.2d 14, 15 (6th Cir. 1976) (same), and United States v.
Smith, 520 F.2d 544, 548 (8th Cir. 1975) (same), with United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d
1453, 1472-73 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that a defendant's proposed stipulation to the fact
of prior conviction requires the trial court to exclude the name and nature of the prior
-conviction from the case), United States v. Jones, 67 F.3d 320, 322-25 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(same), United States v. Tavares, 21 F.3d 1, 3-5 (1st Cir. 1994) (en bane) (same), and
United States v. Poore, 594 F.2d 39, 40-43 (4th Cir. 1979) (same). See infra notes 122-39
(reviewing cases that illustrate the division among the circuits).
50. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 647. Justice Souter wrote the majority opinion, and
joining him in the opinion were Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer. See Id.
Justice O'Connor wrote the dissenting opinion, and joining her in the dissent were Chief
Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia and Thomas. See id. at 656 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); infra notes 82-105 and accompanying text (discussing the dissent).
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to stipulate the evidence of his prior conviction 5 l
The Court began its analysis by noting that as a threshold
requirement under Rule 401, the name of a prior conviction as stated
in the official record is relevant to the prior-conviction element of a
§ 922(g)(1) offense because it makes a defendant's guilt more
probable than it would be without the evidence.52 Therefore, the
Court concluded that Old Chief's prior conviction for assault was
relevant evidence admissible under Rule 402.53
Next, the Court turned to an analysis under Rule 403. In the
context of a criminal case in which the defendant offered to stipulate
an element of the alleged offense, the Court recognized the
predominant issue was the scope of the trial judge's discretion51
Thus, the Court sought to clarify the scope of that discretion by
interpreting the ambiguous phrases of Rule 403.55 It initially noted
that "unfair prejudice" refers to the potential for relevant evidence to
entice the factfinder away from a rational line of thinking and a
decision based on specific proof of the alleged crime into an
improper chain of reasoning for a determination of guilt5 6 The Court
suggested that the jury might use evidence of prior bad acts to make
the misguided generalization that a defendant had the propensity to
perpetrate the crime charged.57
The Court then recognized that under Rule 403 a trial court
must evaluate the admissibility of relevant evidence by balancing the
relative "probative value" of prior-conviction evidence against the
danger of unfair prejudice.8 The Court addressed two possible
approaches for the Rule 403 balancing test.5 9  Under the first
approach, an item offered for evidence may be viewed in isolation as
an "island," with valuations of its own probative value and unfair
prejudice being the sole considerations to determine its
51. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 655.
52. See iU. at 649.
53. See id.; see also supra note 9 (quoting FED. RK EVID. 401, 402).
54. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 650.
55. See id. at 650-53.
56. See id. at 650.
57. See iLL The Court also referred to the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 403,
which explains "unfair prejudice" by noting that" 'within its context [it] means an undue
tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an
emotional one.'" Id. (quoting FED. R. EviD. 403 advisory committee's note).
58. See id. at 651. While the majority discussed both probative value and unfair
prejudice in its analysis under Rule 403, the dissent did not address the concept of
probative value or the majority's view of the phrase.
59. See id.
1998] 1059
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admissibility.6° According to the second approach, the question of
admissibility may require a complete contextual assessment of all
evidence available in a particular case as the trial judge understands
it at the time of the evidentiary ruling.61 The second approach
extends beyond the first one by requiring the trial judge, after a party
has objected to the evidence, to evaluate the degrees of the probative
value and the unfair prejudice for the item in question and for any
available substitutes.A The Court readily adopted the second
approach, and therefore, it concluded, a determination of the
probative value of the evidence in question must consider the
availability of alternative evidence.' If the judge finds that the
alternatives have substantially the same or even greater probative
value, but less risk of unfair prejudice, then the judge should exercise
sound discretion to discount the probative value of the evidence
offered first." The judge should exclude the evidence offered
60. See id
61. See id.; see also Dolan, supra note 10, at 233-34 (recognizing the difficulty courts
face in deciding whether to determine the probative value of each piece of evidence in
isolation or in light of what it contributes to the weight of the showing of evidence on a
particular fact, and endorsing the latter); D. Craig Lewis, Proof and Prejudice: A
Constitutional Challenge to the Treatment of Prejudicial Evidence in Federal Criminal
Cases, 64 WAsH. L. REv. 289, 318-19 (1989) (supporting the drafters' recognition that
assessments of unfair prejudice and probative value should be contextual); Mengler,
supra note 5, at 442 (noting that the balancing test requires the trial court "to look at
other evidence already admitted against the litigant, as well as at the evidence in
question"); Saltzburg, supra note 2, at 1011 (acknowledging that judges often limit their
determination of probative value to the specific item in question and thus fail to account
for its probative value in light of its relationship to other evidence).
62. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 651.
63. See iU. at 652. The Court elaborated on this point by distinguishing between the
probative value of a piece of evidence and its relevance. See id, Based on the availability
of evidentiary alternatives, the probative value of the evidence at issue may vary. See id.
However, this variation does not detract from the relevancy of the piece of evidence. See
id.; FED. R. Evvm. 403 advisory committee's note; see also FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory
committee's note (noting that no "mechanical solution" exists, but that the decision
should be made in light of the other evidence available); 1 CHARLES T. MCCORMICK,
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 782 n.41 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) (indicating that
probative value is relative to the alternative evidence available); 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM,
supra note 12, § 5250, at 546-47 (stating that the availability of other evidence on the
same issue affects the probative value).
64. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 651. Professor Louis Jacobs criticizes the Court's
"Wal-Mart" approach to discounting probative value and argues that its approach
obscures the factors balanced under Rule 403. See Louis A. Jacobs, Evidence Rule 403
After United States v. Old Chief, 20 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 563, 569 (1997). Professor
Jacobs identifies four major flaws in the Court's "discount" methodology under Rule 403.
See id. First, while the need for a particular piece of evidence may vary according to the
availability of acceptable alternatives, its probative value remains fixed. See id. at 569-70.
Second, balancing is a special kind of weighing that permits measurement of conflicting
factors that are intrinsically different, while weighing requires a common measure. See it
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initially if its risk of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its
reduced probative value.6
Consistent with the general rule that permits the prosecution to
choose its evidence despite a defendant's proposed stipulation, the
Court limited its holding in Old Chief.6 It noted that the trial judge
must not forget to consider the prosecution's need to paint a
complete evidentiary picture in order to prove its case.67
Accordingly, the Court limited its ruling to cases involving proof of
felon status and stated that a defendant still has the burden, on
appeal, of demonstrating an abuse of discretion.6 Recognizing that a
criminal defendant cannot stipulate out of the evidentiary impact of
the prosecution's choice of proof and that jurors bring certain
expectations with them into the courtroom, the Court determined
that the prosecution's need for "evidentiary depth to tell a
continuous story has ... virtually no application when the point at
issue is a defendant's legal status.' ' 69  Therefore, Old Chief's
stipulation of his status as a convicted felon transcended the general
rule that permits the prosecution to choose the evidence it will use to
prove its case.70
In analyzing the case under Rule 403, the Court noted that
propensity evidence may be relevant.7' Nevertheless, the chance that
the jury will convict because of prior crimes or because of its
determination that a bad person deserves punishment creates
prejudice that outweighs ordinary relevance.2 Under this
at 570. Thus, after the court has discounted the probative value, it should balance, rather
than weigh, the discounted probative value and the risk of unfair prejudice in the context
of the specific case. See id. Third, because Rule 403 necessarily entails the use of judicial
discretion in the balancing process, no single factor ought to be treated as grounds for a
per se ruling. See id. at 571. According to Professor Jacobs, the Court in Old Chief
overemphasized the probative value of the evidence and neglected other important
factors such as the "explicit preference for admission that Rule 403's passive voice and
use of the adverb 'substantially' reflect." Id. Finally, the Court's methodology failed to
produce a standard conducive to regular use by a trial judge. See id.
65. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 651.
66. See id.
67. See d.
68. See 1i at 651 n.7.
69. Id. at 654; see also United States v. Rhodes, 32 F.3d 867, 871 (4th Cir. 1994)
(noting that "[t]he nature of the conviction is not an element of section 922(g)(1)").
70. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 654-55.
71. See d. at 650-51. The Court noted that Rule 404(b) directly addresses propensity
evidence by making" 'evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts'" inadmissible to prove
one's character for the purpose of showing one acted in conformity therewith. Id. at 651
(quoting FED. R. EvID. 404(b)); see infra note 72 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 404(b)).
72. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 651 (citing United States v. Moccia, 681 F.2d 61, 63
(1st Cir. 1982)). Under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
10611998]
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framework, the Court held that evidence of the name and nature of
the prior conviction unquestionably carried the risk of unfair
prejudice because the record was conspicuous enough to tempt the
jurors into a line of bad character reasoning.73 Moreover, the
stipulation was a reasonable alternative that was relevant, admissible,
and conclusive evidence of the prior-conviction element. 74 The Court
noted, however, that the mere existence of evidentiary alternatives
does not automatically result in an abuse of discretion by the trial
court. 5 A defendant cannot satisfy the abuse of discretion standard
if he simply provides other means of proof that the prosecution,
which has broad discretion in choosing how to present its case, has
not selected.76 Instead, a defendant must establish the failure of the
trial court to meet the balancing requirement under Rule 403. 7
The Court stated that Old Chief's offer to stipulate had
evidentiary value that was at least equivalent to the prosecution's
own evidence.7 Therefore, because no discernible difference existed
between the probative value of the stipulation and the official
conviction record, the Court concluded that the risk of unfair
prejudice inherent in the official record substantially outweighed its
probative value.79 For these reasons, the Court held that the trial
court abused its discretion in admitting the name and nature of the
prior conviction. ° Thus, the Court's analysis under the balancing
process of Rule 403 required the prosecution to accept the
stipulation.8 '
[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident ....
FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
73. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 651.
74. See UL at 653.
75. See Ud at 651-52.
76. See id. at 652.
77. See iU.
7& See id at 653.
79. See id. at 655.
80. See U
81. See id. at 655-56. The Court stated:
Given [the] peculiarities of the element of felony-convict status and of
admissions and the like when used to prove it, there is no cognizable difference
between the evidentiary significance of an admission and of the legitimately
probative component of the official record the prosecution would prefer to place
in evidence.
Id. at 655. However, the Court also recognized the limited nature of its holding under
these particular circumstances. See id. at 656; supra text accompanying notes 66-68.
[Vol. 761062
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In dissent, Justice O'Connor argued that the majority misapplied
Rule 403 and upset the long-standing precedent that permits the
prosecution in criminal trials to choose the evidence it will use to
prove its case.' She maintained that the majority created a new rule
under § 922(g)(1), with which a defendant can require the
prosecution to accept a stipulation to the fact of prior felony
conviction, thus preventing the prosecution from submitting direct
evidence to prove an essential element of its case-namely,
conviction of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year.83 Justice O'Connor supported her position that
Old Chiefs record of conviction did not present unfair prejudice by
stating first that all evidence, to some degree, is prejudicial. 4
However, she noted, Rule 403 requires that the prejudice be "unfair,"
and thus the rule does not allow the court to exclude the
prosecution's evidence just because it may prove detrimental to the
defendant.s Asserting that the majority never explained exactly why
the prior-conviction record could cause "unfair" prejudice, Justice
O'Connor pointed out that the list of exceptions for admitting
evidence of other crimes under Rule 404(b) is clearly not
exhaustive.' Therefore, Justice O'Connor argued that the trial
court's admission of the record of prior conviction was not
82. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 656 (O'Connor, I., dissenting).
83. See id. at 660 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). But see United States v. Rhodes, 32 F.3d
867, 871 (4th Cir. 1994) (stating that "the nature of the conviction is not an element of
section 922(g)(1)"); infra note 122 (citing cases in accord with Rhodes).
84. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 656 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
85. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed out that the Advisory
Committee's Note to Rule 403 suggests that evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it has" 'an
undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis.'" Id. (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note). The dissent failed to
see anything improper about admitting the record of prior conviction. See id. (O'Connor,
J., dissenting). While Justice O'Connor acknowledged the majority's concern that
"improper considerations" may taint the jury's verdict if it learns about the details of a
defendant's prior conviction, she questioned what specifically was improper about the
record that revealed the circumstances surrounding Old Chief's prior conviction. See id.
at 658 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor suggested that "improper
considerations" may include the exact name of the prior felony, the date, the location,
and the name of the victim, or the fact that the charge was joined with other counts of
using a firearm in a violent crime. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Because the Court's
vague standard left open the question of what constitutes an improper consideration,
Justice O'Connor criticized the majority's approach. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
86. See id. at 657 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Rule 404(b) provides a specialized
application of the rule that excludes using circumstantial character evidence. See FED. R
EvID. 404(b) advisory committee's note. While Rule 404(b) does not allow evidence of
other crimes to prove action in conformity therewith, it does permit evidence of other
crimes for "other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
necessarily unfair because the prosecution was merely using the
available evidence to prove conclusively an essential element of its
case.
87
Justice O'Connor further relied on congressional intent to
support her position that evidence of a prior-conviction record was
not unfairly prejudicial to a criminal defendant." She noted that
Congress chose to make a defendant's prior criminal conviction an
element of an offense under § 922(g)(1),19 and she asserted that,
because crimes have names, Congress therefore must have realized
that jurors would learn the name and nature of a defendant's prior
conviction.90 Referring to the structure of § 922(g) as evidence of
Congress's intent,91 Justice O'Connor pointed out that due to the
statutory exception of specific business-related crimes and state
misdemeanors when the punishment is for less than two years, "the
Government must prove that the defendant committed a particular
crime."'  She thus claimed that the prosecution should be able to use
evidence of a prior felony conviction because it shows not only that a
defendant is a prior felon but also that a defendant has engaged in a
specific criminal offense in the past.93 Accordingly, Justice O'Connor
concluded that because the name and nature of an offense are
inseparable from the fact of a prior conviction, they were admissible
as proof of Old Chief's guilt.94
In addition to claiming the lack of unfair prejudice in Old Chief's
record of prior conviction, Justice O'Connor argued that a defendant
87. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 657 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
88. See l at 656-57 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
89. See d. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
90. See id. at 657 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also supra note 28 (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) (1994)). Justice O'Connor thus inferred that within the meaning of the
statute, "'a crime' is not an abstract or metaphysical concept." Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at
656 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
91. Justice O'Connor asserted that the structure of § 922(g)(1) reveals that Congress
was aware that jurors would learn both the name and the basic nature of the defendant's
prior conviction. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 656 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). She further
noted that Congress did not make the statute applicable to all persons with prior felony
convictions, but only to persons convicted of" 'a crime punishable by imprisonment for a
term exceeding one year.'" Id (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting § 922(g)(1)). Thus,
according to Justice O'Connor, § 922(g)(1)'s exclusion of specific crimes enumerated in
§ 921(a)(20) reflects Congress's intent that jurors learn the name and nature of the
defendant's prior criminal offense. See id at 656-57 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also
supra note 28 (quoting § 922(g)(1) and § 921(a)(20)).
92. Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 656-57 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see supra note 28
(quoting the statutory exceptions of § 921(a)(20)).
93. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 657 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
94. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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cannot force the prosecution to accept a stipulation to the prior-
conviction element of a § 922(g)(1) offense.95 However, Justice
O'Connor found even more disturbing the Court's deviation from the
long-standing rule that permits the prosecution in a criminal trial to
choose what evidence it will use to prove its case. 6 By accepting a
defendant's stipulation and thus withholding from the jury detailed
evidence of the prior conviction, a trial court may confuse the juryf 7
Furthermore, Justice O'Connor argued that a criminal defendant
cannot make the prosecution try its case by stipulation.8 In addition
to confirming the prosecution's need for evidentiary depth in
presenting its case, Justice O'Connor recognized that the
Constitution mandates that criminal convictions rest on a jury's
finding a defendant guilty of each element of an alleged offense
beyond a reasonable doubt.99 A defendant's stipulation neither
removes nor negates the prosecution's burden of proof.',, Because a
defendant's decision to agree that the prosecution does not have to
prove an element of the crime charged does not remove the burden
of proof as to that element, 10 Justice O'Connor determined that the
trial court must grant the prosecution wide latitude to offer its choice
of evidence in proving its case.1°2
Justice O'Connor further contended that a criminal defendant
should not be able to force the prosecution to accept a stipulation of
prior conviction because the stipulation may be an attempt to waive a
95. See id. at 656 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
96. See id. at 658 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
97. See id. at 659 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). For example, the jury may question why
it has not been told the name of the defendant's prior conviction, or the jury may
speculate as to why, given the widespread national acceptance of gun ownership, the
defendant's possession of a firearm was illegal. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also
United States v. Barker, 1 F.3d 957, 960 (9th Cir. 1993) (explaining that " '[d]oubt as to
the criminality of [the defendant's] conduct may influence the jury when it considers the
possession element'" (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Collamore,
868 F.2d 24,28 (1st Cir. 1989))).
98. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 659 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
99. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See generally Lewis, supra note 61, at 295
(asserting that Rule 403 is an "unconstitutional balancing test" because it contradicts the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal trials and thus heightens the
chance of trial error).
100. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 659 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Estelle v.
McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 69 (1991) (noting that the defendant's choice not to dispute an
element of the alleged crime does not discharge the prosecution from its duty to prove
every element of the crime).
101. Noting that a stipulation consists of an agreement between a defendant and the
prosecution, Justice O'Connor asserted that Old Chief and the prosecution never reached
an agreement. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 659 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
102. See id. at 659-60 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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jury trial without the prosecution's consent.103 Under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 23(a), a defendant must have the prosecution's
agreement in order to submit a partial plea of guilty and thus take an
issue from the jury.1 4 Therefore, if Old Chief wanted to use a
stipulation to waive his right to a jury trial on the prior-conviction
element, he needed to have the prosecution's consent, and because
Old Chief failed to obtain that consent, Justice O'Connor concluded,
he could not force the prosecution to accept his proposed
stipulation. 05
A review of the legislative history of Rule 403 and the case law
leading up to Old Chief is helpful in achieving a clearer
understanding of the Court's interpretation of the rule. The Court's
decision reflects issues that were in contention during the drafting of
Rule 403. The common law traditionally recognized that particular
situations necessitated the exclusion of unequivocally relevant
evidence,"° and the discretionary power established by the case law
increased significantly through the codification of the Federal Rules
of Evidence." However, the Preliminary Draft of the Federal Rules
of Evidence bifurcated Rule 403, making the exclusion of evidence
mandatory when the danger of unfair prejudice, or of misleading or
confusing the jury, substantially outweighed the probative value of
evidence, l"' but making the exclusion discretionary when
103. See id. at 660 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
104. See FED. R. CPrM. P. 23(a); Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 660 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
105. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 660 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
106. See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note; 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN &
MARGARET A. BERGER, ,VEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 403App.01[2], at
403App.-1 (John L. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 1997). The circumstances requiring exclusion
of unquestionably relevant evidence involve risks that "range all the way from inducing
decision on a purely emotional basis, at one extreme, to nothing more harmful than
merely wasting time, at the other extreme," and while the rules following Rule 403
involve more particular situations, Rule 403 "is designed as a guide for the handling of
situations for which no specific rules have been formulated." FED. R. EvID. 403 advisory
committee's note; see 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra, § 403App.01[2], at 403App.-1.
107. See Victor J. Gold, Limiting Judicial Discretion to Exclude Prejudicial Evidence,
18 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 59,60 (1984). Professor Gold also notes that codification "creates
the danger that the imprecision and rigidity of the written word will obscure underlying
statutory policy," but that Rule 403 intended to address this danger by permitting
"discretionary exclusion of evidence when admission would undermine accurate
factfinding and procedural fairness, the basic goals of modem evidence law." Id; see also
Glenn Weissenberger, The Supreme Court and the Interpretation of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 53 OHIO ST. L. 1307, 1334-35 (1992) (describing Rule 403 as a codification of
the "long-standing power of the trial judge to exclude evidence").
10& See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District
Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 225 (1969) [hereinafter Preliminary Draft of
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considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or unnecessary
presentation of cumulative evidence substantially outweighed its
probative value.19 The separation of the sections accentuated the
expansive discretionary authority of the trial court to classify offered
evidence according to the particular facts of each case."' In addition,
because of the wide discretion created by the ambiguity in words such
as "unfair prejudice," "substantially outweighed," and "danger," the
court's finding would be virtually unreviewable under the rule."'
Therefore, in order to avoid this threat and upon the
recommendation of the Department of Justice, the final draft
eliminated the mandatory exclusion."2
While the codification of Rule 403 substantiated common-law
precepts," the rule's underlying rationale and policy concerns were
unclear."4 Thus, the rule has stirred widespread debate about its
goals. One view cites "accuracy and fairness through judicial
flexibility" as the fundamental purpose and policy of Rule 403,5
while another description connects the policy of Rule 403 with the
policies behind other rules of evidence."6  For example, in
Proposed Rules of Evidence]; see also 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 106,
§ 403App.100[1], at 403App.-3 (noting the bifurcation in the preliminary draft); 22
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 5211, at 244 n.1 (citing the proposed draft).
109. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence, supra note 108, at 225;
2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 106, § 403App.100[1], at 403App.-3; 22 WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 5211, at 244 n.1.
110. See 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 106, § 403App.100[1], at 403App.-3.
However, the distinction was one "of emphasis rather than kind." 2 id.
111 See 2 id.; see also Imwinkelried, supra note 7, at 888 (describing the terms of Rule
403 as ambiguous).
112. See 117 CONG. REC. 33,650 (1971) ("It is generally recognized that this matter is
best left to the discretion of the trial judge."); see also 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra
note 106, § 403App.100[1], at 403App.-4 (quoting a Department of Justice report
recognizing the need for trial court discretion); 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 12,
§ 5211, at 245-46 n.9 (same). Congress did not make any textual changes in Rule 403 as
drafted by the Supreme Court. See 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 106,
§ 403App.01[3], at 403App.-2; 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 5211, at 246.
113. See 1 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & MICHAEL M. MARTIN, FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE MANUAL 160 (5th ed. 1990); Cleary, supra note 1, at 909.
114. See FED. R. EviD. 403 & advisory committee's note.
115. Gold, supra note 7, at 499; see also Gold, supra note 107, at 60 (asserting that
discretionary exclusion promotes "accurate factfinding and procedural fairness, the basic
goals of modem evidence law"). Professor Gold's view of Rule 403 accords with Rule
102. See Gold, supra note 107, at 65 n.18 (stating that both courts and commentators
acknowledge that "Rule 102 identifies the policies that should control the exercise of
discretion under Rule 403"); see also Lewis, supra note 61, at 290-91 (noting the
purported aim of the Federal Rules of Evidence as stated in Rule 102); Mengler, supra
note 5, at 446 (stating that Rule 403 permits trial judges to effectuate the policies of Rule
102); supra note 4 (quoting FED. R. EvID. 102).
116. See 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 5212, at 250. Professors Wright and
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accordance with policies similar to the ones expressed in Federal
Rule of Evidence 102,1 7 the three main goals of Rule 403 may be
described as avoiding error by the factfinder, promoting both real
and perceived fairness in the judicial process, and attaining an
economical fact-finding process. 18 In this respect, Rule 403 does not
establish an unequivocal standard, but serves as a guide to the courts
in the absence of precise, controlling standards."9 A narrower
interpretation of Rule 403's application describes the rule as an
attempt to conventionalize and to direct the use of discretion in
applying the rules of evidence."t2  However, establishing a
conventionalized use of discretion would limit judicial flexibility and
thus would also seem to circumscribe the potential effectiveness of
the more general policy of promoting the search for truth and
justice.'
The application of Rule 403 in cases involving the treatment of
defendants' offers to stipulate evidence of the prior-conviction
element of § 922(g)(1) illustrates two different viewpoints among the
federal courts of appeals. Some circuits refused to allow evidence of
a defendant's prior conviction when a defendant offered to stipulate,
and therefore they ruled that the prosecution could not introduce
evidence of a prior felony in the absence of extenuating
circumstances.' m Other circuits, in contrast, held that the defense's
Graham note, for example, the need created by Rule 401 for an additional means of
determining the roles of the conventional understandings of relevance, the boundaries
imposed by Rule 402 on courts' attempts to fashion new exclusionary rules, and the values
under Rule 102 that are to be promoted by the prudent exercise of discretion. See 22 id.
117. See FED. R. EvID. 102; see also supra note 4 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 102).
11& See Dolan, supra note 10, at 226; see also 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 10a, at 684 (Peter Tillers rev. ed., 1983) (citing also the
prevention of jury error as an aim of Rule 403).
119. See FED. R. Evm. 403 advisory committee's note; see also 2 WEINSTEIN &
BERGER, supra note 106, § 403App.100[2], at 403App.-6 n.4 (citing cases from the federal
courts of appeals).
120. See 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 5212, at 250. In addition,
Professors Wright and Graham note that the policy of Rule 403 is "limiting judicial
discretion in the admission and exclusion of evidence." 22 id § 5214, at 263.
121. See FED. R. EviD. 102; see also supra note 4 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 102).
122. Among the courts of appeals adhering to this rule are the First, Second, Fourth,
Fifth, and Tenth Circuits. See United States v. Lomeli, 76 F.3d 146, 150-51 (7th Cir.
1996); United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1472-73 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Palmer, 37 F.3d 1080, 1084-85 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Tavares, 21 F.3d 1, 5 (1st
Cir. 1994) (en banc); United States v. Gilliam, 994 F.2d 97, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1993); United
States v. Poore, 594 F.2d 39, 40-43 (4th Cir. 1979); see also infra notes 124-30 and
accompanying text (discussing cases decided in these appellate courts based on the rule
that the prosecution should accept a defendant's stipulation).
The District of Columbia Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit also fall into this category,
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offer of stipulation could not bar the prosecution's introduction of
evidence on the nature of a prior conviction.'2
The circuits that required the prosecution to accept a
defendant's offer to stipulate to his status as a convicted felon under
§ 922(g)(1) held that a district court's refusal to exclude the nature of
a defendant's prior felony conviction from the evidence admitted at
trial was an abuse of its discretion because when a defendant
stipulated the fact of a prior felony conviction, the nature of the prior
conviction was not an essential element of a § 922(g)(1) offense.12 In
but they have stated more specifically that the trial court, in the exercise of its sound
discretion, could limit the prosecution's proof under Rule 403 to the fact of a defendant's
prior conviction for an unnamed felony. See United States v. Jones, 67 F.3d 320, 322-24
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that the district court committed reversible error by denying the
defendant's motion to exclude evidence of his prior felony conviction when he
volunteered to stipulate to the fact); United States v. O'Shea, 724 F.2d 1514, 1516 (11th
Cir. 1984) (recognizing that because an offer to stipulate is a factor that the trial court
ought to consider under Rule 403, an abuse of discretion may exist when the trial court
allows the nature of the prior offense into evidence).
123. The courts of appeals adhering to the line of reasoning not requiring the
prosecution to accept the stipulation are the Third, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. See
United States v. Breitkreutz, 8 F.3d 688, 690-92 (9th Cir. 1993), abrogated by Old Chief v.
United States, 117 S. Ct. 644 (1997); United States v. Burkhart, 545 F.2d 14, 15 (6th Cir.
1976), abrogated by Old Chief v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 644 (1997); United States v.
Smith, 520 F.2d 544, 548 (8th Cir. 1975), abrogated by Old Chief v. United States, 117 S.
Ct. 644 (1997); see also infra notes 131-39 and accompanying text (discussing cases
decided by these appellate courts according to the rule that the prosecution does not have
to accept a defendant's stipulation).
In United States v. Williams, 612 F.2d 735 (3d Cir. 1979), the Third Circuit held that
the prosecution did not have to accept the defendant's stipulation to the prior-conviction
element and that the prosecution had the right to offer proof on the point admitted, see id
at 740. The Supreme Court in Old Chief did not cite Williams because it dealt with title
18, § 922(h)(1) of the United States Code, a provision that, similar to § 922(g)(1),
prohibited convicted felons from receiving firearms shipped in interstate commerce. See
I at 736, 739-40. By analogy, however, the same reasoning applies to Williams. In fact,
Williams even cited Smith as a case with a "like holding" involving a "similar statute."
See id. at 740.
124. See Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1472-73 (holding that when a defendant offers to stipulate
to the existence of a prior felony conviction, the trial court ought to admit the stipulation
as proof of the prior-conviction element or provide an alternative means of evidence that
reveals only the fact of prior felony conviction); Palmer, 37 F.3d at 1084-85 (holding that a
stipulation does not interfere with the prosecution's right to present evidence); Tavares,
21 F.3d at 5 (holding that the prosecution must accept a defendant's stipulation as to
felony status and cannot introduce evidence of the nature of the prior felony in the
absence of extenuating circumstances); Gilliam, 994 F.2d at 102-03 (holding that the
prosecution did not have to accept the defendant's proposed stipulation to the entire
element of prior conviction but that the prosecution would have had to accept a
stipulation to the fact of prior conviction if it had not agreed to do so); Poore, 594 F.2d at
42 (holding that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to strike the nature of
the defendant's prior felony conviction from the indictment when the defendant offered
to stipulate to the prior conviction).
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applying Rule 403, some courts recognized the probative value of the
stipulation as a factor for consideration in the balancing process.lrs
Most courts, however, focused on the nature of the prior conviction,
declaring it to be irrelevant under a § 922(g)(1) charge because the
statute does not call for a particular kind of prior felony conviction,
but rather "any felony conviction suffices."'' 1 Furthermore, the
acceptance of a stipulation to the fact of prior conviction under
§ 922(g)(1) does not interfere with the prosecution's right to present
its case fully because "[t]he status element is a discrete and
independent component of the crime," and thus "the predicate crime
is significant only to demonstrate status, and a full picture of that
offense is-even if not prejudicial-beside the point."'' 1  Therefore,
In Poore, the defendant was charged under title 18, § 1202(a)(1) of the United States
Code, the forerunner of § 922(g), which stated that any person who has been convicted of
a felony and receives, possesses, or transports in commerce any firearm will be fined a
maximum $10,000 or imprisoned for no more than two years or both. See Poore, 594 F.2d
at 40 n.2.; Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified at 18
U.S.C. app. § 1202(a) (1994)), repealed by Act of May 19, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100
Stat. 459, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 459.
125. See O'Shea, 724 F.2d at 1516; cf. United States v. Quintero, 872 F.2d 107,111 (5th
Cir. 1989) (noting that a defendant's offer of stipulation weighs in the balancing process
of determining the probative value of additional convictions). But see Breitkreutz, 8 F.3d
at 692 ("A stipulation... has no place in the Rule 403 balancing process.").
The Fifth Circuit in O'Shea affirmed the general rule that the prosecution cannot
prevent the defense's offer of proof through a stipulation. See O'Shea, 724 F.2d at 1516
(relying on Parr v. United States, 255 F.2d 86, 88 (5th Cir. 1958)). However, the court
noted that Rule 403 qualifies the principle by placing the final decision to exclude
evidence under Rule 403 in the "'sound discretion of the trial court, tempered by the
particular facts presented.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Grassi, 602 F.2d 1192, 1197
(5th Cir. 1979)). The court concluded that because a codefendant intended to introduce
evidence of O'Shea's prior conviction and the witnesses testifying would also more than
likely reveal his past conviction, and because a stipulation is only one factor for
consideration in the Rule 403 equation, the trial court's refusal to accept the stipulation
did not constitute an abuse of discretion. See id. at 1516-17.
126. Poore, 594 F.2d at 41 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Kemper, 503 F.2d
327, 329-30 (6th Cir. 1974) (stating that in cases involving an alleged violation under
§ 922(g), "[ilt should suffice for the indictment to contain language simply stating that
defendant had previously been convicted in a specified court of a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, omitting language descriptive of the
offense")); see also Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1472-73 (holding that evidence of the nature of the
prior crime is irrelevant because "the probative value of th[e] additional information
generally will be overshadowed by its prejudicial effect under Federal Rule of Evidence
403"); Jones, 67 F.3d at 324 (recognizing the nature of the defendant's prior conviction as
irrelevant under § 922(g)); United States v. Rhodes, 32 F.3d 867, 870-71 (4th Cir. 1994)
(holding that the prosecution cannot introduce evidence of a defendant's specific prior
felony); Tavares, 21 F.3d at 3-4 (observing that the nature of the prior felony is not
relevant to a § 922(g) charge); Giliam, 994 F.2d at 103 ("The underlying facts of the prior
conviction ... are completely irrelevant to § 922(g)(1). The jury has no need to know the
nature of the prior conviction .... ).
127. Tavares, 21 F.3d at 4; see also Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1472 (recognizing that the
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in terms of Rule 403, the courts' decisions implied that the danger of
unfair prejudice arising from the details surrounding a defendant's
prior conviction outweighed the probative value.
Several of the circuits that required the prosecution to accept a
defendant's stipulation drew a careful distinction between a
stipulation in which a defendant tries to keep the entire element of a
prior felony conviction from the jury and a stipulation in which a
defendant seeks to exclude evidence concerning the nature and the
details of a prior felony conviction.'2 For example, the Second
nature of the prior felony is irrelevant); Jones, 67 F.3d at 323 (quoting Tavares); United
States v. Lewis, 40 F.3d 1325, 1342 (1st Cir. 1994) (stating that the district court should
have accepted defendants' offers to stipulate their status as felons); Katherine Conboy,
Note, Probative or Prejudicial? Defendant Charged as Felon in Possession of a Firearm
May Stipulate to Status as Felon-United States v. Tavares, 21 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1994), 29
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 941, 945-46 (1995) (noting the appropriately limited ruling by the
court in Tavares).
The Tavares court carefully emphasized the narrow scope of its ruling, declaring that
it was not establishing a per se rule of exclusion. See Tavares, 21 F.3d at 5 ("[W]e are not
saying that the fact of the prior predicate felony can be kept from the jury .... [The
prosecution ordinarily cannot be forced to accept a stipulation if it prefers to introduce a
judgment of conviction properly redacted."). Instead, the court held, the trial court
should refuse to permit evidence exceeding the fact of prior conviction unless the trial
court finds that the noncumulative relevance is adequately compelling to withstand the
balancing process under Rule 403. See id.; see also id. at 7 (Selya, CJ., concurring)
(stressing the circumscribed holding by the majority and asserting that the district courts
should refrain from any efforts to formulate a general rule based on the majority's case-
specific ruling).
The court also discussed the effectiveness of other alternatives available to prove a
defendant's status, including a redacted record, an affidavit by the defendant, testimony
from a clerk, or judicial notice. See id. at 5; see'also Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1472-73 (stating
that the trial court can provide an alternative procedure that reveals the fact, but neither
the nature nor the details, of a defendant's prior felony conviction). However, the First
Circuit noted that the defense cannot hide a prior felony conviction from the jury, and
while the defense usually cannot force the prosecution to accept a stipulation, the trial
court maintains the discretion to exclude a redacted record if the nature or number of
convictions would unfairly prejudice the jury. See Tavares, 21 F.3d at 5; see also Wacker,
72 F.3d at 1473 (recognizing that the prosecution still maintains broad discretion to offer
evidence of the underlying details of a crime if the facts are actually relevant to the case).
Furthermore, the Tavares court underscored the fact that the part of § 922(g)(1) that
made the defendant's status relevant was the existence of a prior conviction punishable by
a prison sentence exceeding one year. See Tavares, 21 F.3d at 4. Thus, the statute "does
not embrace additional facts such as a particular kind of felony. Congress required no
gradation for seriousness, numerosity or recency, although such distinctions have in other
contexts been given significance." Id.
128. See Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1472; Gilliam, 994 F.2d at 102-03; see also Tavares, 21 F.3d
at 5 (stating that there is rarely any reason, "other than the government's desire to color
the jury's perception of the defendant's character, for revealing the nature of the
defendant's prior felony"); United States v. Barker, 1 F.3d 957, 959 n.3 (9th Cir. 1993)
(describing the underlying facts of the prior conviction as wholly irrelevant in the context
of § 922(g)(1)), modified, 20 F.3d 365 (9th Cir. 1994); Conboy, supra note 127, at 946
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Circuit emphasized that "it is the fact of such a conviction that is
pertinent to the statute and to the crime charged, which is why the
fact of the conviction cannot be removed from the jury's
consideration."'12 9 The Second Circuit also pointed out that the
"underlying facts of the prior conviction, however, are completely
irrelevant to § 922(g)(1). The jury has no need to know the nature of
the prior conviction; all that it needs to know is that there was a prior
conviction sufficient to sustain that element of the crime."'30
Other circuits took a different view, rejecting the effect of a
defendant's stipulation by asserting that introduction of a defendant's
felony record did not constitute substantial prejudice. 3' Some of
(noting that the nature of the prior conviction lacks relevance in the context of
§ 922(g)(1)); supra note 127 (discussing the holding in Tavares).
Under § 922(g)(1), the prosecution must prove three elements: possession of a
firearm, transportation of the firearm in interstate commerce, and prior felony conviction.
See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1994). A stipulation to the prior-conviction element removes
the entire element from the jury's consideration; consequently, the prosecution would be
allowed to present evidence only on the two remaining elements-possession of a firearm
and transportation of the firearm in interstate commerce. See, e.g., Wacker, 72 F.3d at
1472-73; Tavares, 21 F.3d at 3, 5; Gilliam, 994 F.2d at 102-03; see also Jennifer M.
Granhohn & William J. Richards, Bifurcated Justice: How Trial-Splitting Devices Defeat
the Jury's Role, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 505, 524-30 (1995) (explaining the appropriate use of
stipulations in felon-in-possession cases). Although courts will not allow a defendant to
stipulate to the entire element, some courts will allow the a defendant to stipulate to the
fact of his prior felony conviction. Thus, while his status as a prior felon will go the jury as
proof of the prior felony conviction, the name and nature of the past crime remain
undisclosed for fear of unfair prejudice. See, e.g., Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1472-73; Tavares, 21
F.3d at 3, 5; Gilliam, 994 F.2d at 102-03.
129. Gilliam, 994 F.2d at 102; see also Granholm. & Richards, supra note 128, at 528-30
(discussing Gilliam and noting that a stipulation to the fact of a prior felony conviction,
but not the element itself, aids the prosecution in establishing the full crime, yet protects
the defendant from unfairness).
130. Gilliam, 994 F.2d at 103. While the prosecution willingly consented to the
defendant's stipulating the fact of his felony status, it refused to accept the defendant's
offer to stipulate the entire element of prior conviction. See id. at 102-03. The court
noted that if the prosecution had not accepted the defendant's stipulation to the fact of his
felony status, the trial court would have excluded any evidence about the nature of the
defendant's prior convictions because under § 922(g)(1) proof of only one conviction
suffices. See id. at 102 (citing United States v. Pirovolos, 844 F.2d 415, 420 (7th Cir. 1988)
(holding that the trial judge committed error by admitting evidence of prior convictions
when the defendant offered to stipulate to a single but sufficient prior conviction)). The
Gilliam court reasoned that withholding evidence relating to the nature of the prior
conviction conveyed to the jury the gravity of the crime without biasing them with
potentially prejudicial details. See id. at 103. Furthermore, because the trial court's
limiting instruction discouraged the jury from speculating about the nature of the
defendant's prior conviction, no abuse of discretion occurred. See id.; see also Stephen A.
Saltzburg, Trial Tactics: Stipulations, Part III: Convicted Felons on Trial, CRIM. JUST.,
Summer 1995, at 31, 33-34 (discussing the facts and holding in Gilliam and concluding that
Gilliam illustrates that "there are limits to how far courts will go in forcing stipulations").
131. See United States v. Breitkreutz, 8 F.3d 688, 690-92 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that
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these circuits noted, however, that the introduction of multiple
convictions might raise the possibility of unfair prejudice.1 2 For
example, the Ninth Circuit held that admitting proof of three prior
felony convictions constituted reversible error because a conviction
for being a felon in possession of a firearm required only one prior
conviction.133 While the court based its ruling on the number of
felony convictions, it held that evidence of only one prior conviction
was admissible in spite of the defendant's offer to stipulate the fact."M
Because the balance between probative value and unfair prejudice
under Rule 403 tips remarkably against the admission of subsequent
felonies once the prosecution has proven one, the evidence of other
the prosecution may charge and prove a defendant's prior felony offense despite a
defendant's offer to stipulate), abrogated by Old Chief v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 644
(1997); United States v. Williams, 612 F.2d 735, 740 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that the
prosecution did not have to accept a defendant's stipulation and that the prosecution has
a right to offer proof of the point admitted); United States v. Burkhart, 545 F.2d 14, 15
(6th Cir. 1976) (holding that the prosecution is not limited to proving only one prior
felony conviction as part of its case), abrogated by Old Chief v. United States, 117 S. Ct.
644 (1997); United States v. Smith, 520 F.2d 544,548 (8th Cir. 1975) (holding that the trial
court's admission of the defendant's felony record revealing his multiple felony
convictions did not constitute error because no substantial prejudice resulted), abrogated
by Old Chief v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 644 (1997).
132. See Breitkreutz, 8 F.3d at 692; Smith, 520 F.2d at 548-49; infra note 136 (discussing
the facts and the holding in Breitkreutz). The facts in Smith differ slightly from the
situation in Old Chief. The trial court in Smith permitted the prosecution to present
evidence revealing the defendant's multiple prior convictions, see Smith, 520 F.2d at 548,
whereas the trial court in Old Chief allowed the prosecution to present evidence of the
defendant's one prior, but substantially similar, conviction, see Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at
647. The defendant in Smith was charged with violating title 18, § 1202(a)(1) of the
United States Code, which made it illegal for a person with a prior felony conviction to
receive a firearm that had been shipped in interstate commerce. See Smith, 520 F.2d at
546; see also supra note 124 (noting that § 1202(a)(1) was the predecessor of the current
felon-in-possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1994)).
While the Smith court noted the possibility of prejudice arising from the introduction
of more than one conviction in some cases, it recognized no such prejudice in the case in
question. See Smith, 520 F.2d at 548-49. The court supported its conclusion by noting that
the prosecution had offered the evidence in a customary manner, had not emphasized the
defendant's prior convictions, and had not read or requested that the conviction record be
read to the jury at any point during the trial. See id. Thus it concluded that the
prosecutor minimized the potential prejudice of the evidence. See id.
133. See Breitkreutz, 8 F.3d at 692.
134. See id. In a concurring opinion in Breitkreutz, Judge Norris claimed that the
prosecution should not be allowed to introduce evidence of the entire record of prior
conviction to establish that the defendant was a felon when he committed the alleged
statutory violation. See id. at 693 (Norris, J., concurring). Judge Norris relied on the
court's decision in United States v. Barker, 1 F.3d 957, 959 n.3 (9th Cir. 1993), modified, 20
F.3d 365 (9th Cir. 1994), asserting that under an alleged violation of § 922(g)(1) the
underlying details of the prior conviction are "completely irrelevant," but the basic fact of
the prior conviction's existence is not. See Breitkreutz, 8 F.3d at 693, 695 (Norris, J.,
concurring).
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felonies may then be excluded on the basis of cumulative evidence
under Rule 403.135 In addition, a trial court does not have to consider
the proposed stipulation in its balancing of evidence under Rule
403.135 Other courts rejected the view that limits the prosecution to
proving only one prior conviction as part of its case, holding that the
prosecution could introduce evidence of more than one prior
conviction.137 While these circuits vary about the number of prior
convictions that may be admissible, the shared reasoning behind their
refusals to accept stipulations of prior felony convictions is the long-
standing principle of prosecutorial discretion that permits the
prosecution to prove its case as it wishes.138 Thus, these circuits
endorse the contention that accepting a defendant's stipulation would
135. See Breitkreutz, 8 F.3d at 692; see also Saltzburg, supra note 130, at 31-34
(discussing the facts and holding in Breitkreutz and concluding that proof of multiple
convictions should generally be excluded). But see Burkhart, 545 F.2d at 15 (holding that
the prosecutor did not have to accept the defendant's stipulation and "was not limited to
establishing only one prior conviction"); Smith, 520 F.2d at 548 (holding that the
prosecutor did not have to accept the defendant's stipulation and was not limited to
showing only one of the defendant's multiple prior convictions); supra note 132(discussing the facts and the holding in Smith); infra note 137 (discussing the facts and the
holding in Burkhart).
136. See Breitkreutz, 8 F.3d at 691. Distinguishing a stipulation as a "partial
amendment to the defendant's plea, a means of precluding any and all proof on a
particular issue," id., the court concluded that because a "stipulation is not proof," it does
not belong in the balancing process of Rule 403, hL at 692. The court pointed out the
possible consequences of holding otherwise: In cases in which the defendant offered to
stipulate to a prior felony conviction, or any other element of the prosecution's case, the
balance under Rule 403 would lean toward the prosecution's evidence because it would
unavoidably have minimal, if any, probative value beyond that of the proposed
stipulation. See id. The Ninth Circuit followed the same line of reasoning that a
stipulation is not evidence in affirming the district court's holding in Old Chief. See
United States v. Old Chief, 56 F.3d 75 (table decision), No. 94-30277, 1995 WL 325745, at
*1-*2 (9th Cir. May 31, 1995), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 644 (1997) (stating that alternative
evidence factors into the determination of probative value under the balancing process of
Rule 403); supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text (discussing the viewpoint of the
majority in Old Chief).
137. See Burkhart, 545 F.2d at 15; Smith, 520 F.2d at 548. Burkhart also involved an
alleged violation of § 1202(a)(1), the predecessor of § 922(g)(1). See Burkhart, 545 F.2d
at 15; see also supra note 124 (noting the relationship between § 922(g)(1) and§ 1202(a)(1)). The defendant offered to stipulate his conviction for the lesser of two prior
felonies listed on the indictment in order to keep evidence of either conviction from thejury, but the court refused to force the prosecution to accept the stipulation. See
Burkhart, 545 F.2d at 15. Furthermore, in reliance on Smith, the court pointed out that
the prosecution was not limited to proving only one prior conviction as part of its case.
See id. The court's reliance on Smith seems misplaced, however, because the court in
Smith had noted the possibility of prejudice arising from the introduction of more than
one conviction in some cases. See Smith, 520 F.2d at 548; see also supra note 132
(discussing the Eighth Circuit's holding in Smith).
13& See Breitkreutz, 8 F.3d at 692; United States v. Williams, 612 F.2d 735, 740 (3d
Cir. 1979); Smith, 520 F.2d at 548.
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"seriously undermine the rule that the prosecution has a right to
refuse a stipulation." '139
The federal appeals courts' recognizable discrepancy concerning
stipulations in the context of § 922(g)(1) set the stage for resolution
by the Supreme Court in Old Chief. The Court upheld the prevailing
view of the federal courts of appeals, and it also extended their prior
holdings and clarified some of their concerns. Among the primary
issues resolved in the Court's opinion in Old Chief is the
interpretation of Rule 403, including an explanation of the
ambiguous terms "probative value" and "unfair prejudice" and a
determination of the amount of discretion that the rule affords the
trial court.140 Nevertheless, Old Chief is anomalous in two respects.
First, even though the Court's decision reflects the explicit Rule 403
policy of protecting a defendant from unfair prejudice and the
general Rule 102 policy of promoting the search for truth and
justice,141 it has accomplished these goals at a great cost-one that
effectively removes the trial court's discretion originally granted
under Rule 403.142 Second, despite clarifying the question of
congressional intent under § 922(g)(1), 143 Old Chief unfortunately
raises further questions concerning prosecutorial discretion and
motivation.144
By requiring the trial court to force the prosecution to accept a
defendant's proposed stipulation, the Supreme Court has
contradicted the judicial flexibility built into Rule 403 and has, in
effect, bifurcated the rule, as originally presented in the preliminary
draft. 4 5 The Court crafted its own version of Rule 403 through its
decision to take away some of the trial judge's broad discretion
originally intended by the drafters of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.'4 Even though the Court recognized the limited nature of
its holding, 47 it nevertheless formulated a "general rule [applying]
139. Breitkreutz, 8 F.3d at 692.
140. See infra notes 159-239 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 4 (discussing the goals of the Federal Rules of Evidence).
142. See infra notes 145-58 and accompanying text.
143. See infra notes 240-53 and accompanying text.
144. See infra notes 254-70 and accompanying text.
145. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence, supra note 108, at 225; see
also 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 5211, at 244-45 n.1 (quoting the bifurcation
of Rule 403 in the Preliminary Draft of the Evidence Rules); supra notes 108-12 and
accompanying text (discussing the bifurcation as originally drafted).
146. See 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 5211, at 245-46 n.9; see also
Mengler, supra note 5, at 441 (noting Rule 403's conferral of broad power to trial judges).
147. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 651 n.7 ("[O]ur holding is limited to cases involving
proof of felon status."); see also supra text accompanying notes 66-68 (discussing the
1998] 1075
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
when proof of convict status is at issue."'' 1  The Court has thereby
directly undermined the role the drafters intended for the judiciary to
play in reviewing decisions under Rule 403, for courts should not
"become rulemakers themselves by establishing binding precedents
that narrow or focus the Federal Rules' general language. Appellate
fine-tuning.., is inconsistent with the drafters' purpose.'1 49
While the Court's decision may have achieved individualized
justice, it has sacrificed the flexibility essential to the workings of
Rule 403 in order to arrive at the result.' Rule 403 grants the trial
court "the flexibility to decide that the government already has aimed
enough arrows in the criminal defendant's direction ... and that no
more will be tolerated."'5 ' However, the Court has effectively
removed this flexibility, thus creating a precise, controlling
standard.Y2 In doing so, the Court has taken on a preemptive role by
creating a new rule that will apply in "limited" circumstances. 53
Although the Court's decision worked in opposition to the
flexibility goal of Rule 403, its decision nevertheless promoted some
of the general policies underlying the Federal Rules of Evidence and,
specifically, Rule 403.154 In the context of cases involving the felon-
in-possession statute, the opinion can be seen as an attempt to
advance the general policy of promoting the search for truth and
justice. 55 The Court's interpretation of the essential terms of Rule
403 illustrates an effort to achieve fairness in the judicial process. 6
Furthermore, by limiting the amount of judicial discretion, the new
Court's limitation on its holding).
148. Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 656.
149. Mengler, supra note 5, at 458 (footnote omitted). Professor Mengler further
notes that the drafters also intended for the generality and flexibility of the Federal Rules
to continue, based in part on the idea that "each trial is unique and calls for discrete
resolution" and individualized justice. IM. at 457-58; see also 22 WRiGHT & GRAHAM,
supra note 12, § 5215, at 279 (asserting that courts need not strictly adhere to precedent
established under Rule 403).
150. See Mengler, supra note 5, at 458.
151. Id. at 446. Furthermore, Rule 403 permits the trial judge to allocate fairly the
prejudice between the parties in a criminal trial. See id.
152. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 656. But see Mengler, supra note 5, at 415
(proclaiming that the drafters intended flexible principles, not rigid rules with mechanical
application); 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 106, § 403App.100[2], at 403App.-6
(arguing that Rule 403 acts as a guide to courts in the absence of fixed standards).
153. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 651 n.7.
154. See supra notes 113-21 and accompanying text (discussing the policies of Rule
403).
155. See FED. R EVID. 102; Lewis, supra note 61, at 290-91. By stating the general
policies of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 102 applies to Rule 403. See FED. R.
EviD. 102; supra note 4 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 102).
156. See FED. R. EviD. 102.
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interpretation may also further the policy of lowering the risk of juror
error,15 but only when the facts do not vary substantially from the
ones in Old Chief."8
However, the majority's narrow reading of Rule 403 is consistent
with the prevailing interpretations of the key terms of the rule.
"Probative value" has numerous interpretations due to the ambiguity
inherent in the phrase.5 9 For example, the Advisory Committee's
Note to Rule 403 associates probative value with the need for the
evidence,' 6° and some commentators have asserted that probative
value may also address the dual concerns of reliability and accuracy
in fact-finding.16' In contrast, another view of probative value claims
157. See 1 WIGMORE, supra note 118, § 10a, at 684; Dolan, supra note 10, at 226. But
see Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 659 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that juror confusion
may result from withholding the details of a defendant's prior conviction); Daniel C.
Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating away Prosecutorial Accountability?, 83
VA. L. REV. 939, 941 (1997) (describing the Court's "futile effort" to minimize the unfair
prejudice created in § 922(g)(1) cases); supra note 97 and accompanying text (discussing
Justice O'Connor's view of the effect of withholding evidence of the name and nature of
the prior felony offense). Professor Richman asserts that the rule established by the
Court in Old Chief does not mean that juries will no longer consider the nature of a
defendant's felony. See Richman, supra, at 941. Rather, he argues that the rule "merely
deprives them of accurate information about it. The juror who gives any thought to the
nature of a defendant's underlying felony can only speculate ... [,] and that will simply be
driven underground by instructions that she not consider the defendant's prior record."
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Saltzburg, supra note 2, at 1019 (noting that because
jurors bring certain expectations with them to the courtroom, they may punish a party
who deprives them of specific evidence by making a negative judgment against the party).
Even though the majority cites Professor Saltzburg's article, it dismisses his argument by
claiming that the general rule allowing broad prosecutorial discretion does not apply in
the context of a case in which a defendant's legal status is at issue. See Old Chief, 117 S.
Ct. at 654.
158. While the Court noted that the exclusion of the name of a prior conviction may
apply outside of the context of a formal admission, see Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 655 n.10, it
was careful to limit its holding to cases involving the proof of felon status, see id at 651
n.7.
159. See 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 5214, at 269; see also DAVID P.
LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: SELECTED RULES OF
ADMISSIBILrrY § 1.9.2, at 1:55 (Richard D. Friedman ed., 1998) (noting that the probative
value of the evidence incorporates the idea that the jury will use the evidence
appropriately).
160. See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note (stating that courts should
balance "the probative value of and need for the evidence" with the potential harm of
admitting the evidence).
161. See Gold, supra note 107, at 74; Lewis, supra note 61, at 315. Professor Gold
further describes the appropriate measure of probative value under Rule 403 as including
considerations of "both the degree to which the evidence increases the certainty of the
existence of a fact in issue, given the other evidence in the case, as well as the probability
the jury will correctly perceive the degree of certainty and the fact affected." Gold, supra
note 107, at 79.
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that it functions as a more relative concept that incorporates notions
of both relevancy and logical distance.162 Even though some judges
may think in mathematical or ethical terms in trying to determine
what value a piece of evidence has, the phrase commonly refers to
economic value, or "value in the relative sense, as being determined
by supply and demand."'16 In other words, the crux of the phrase
centers on a determination of the need for the evidence.16
Another explanation of the concept of probative value
distinguishes between considering the availability of alternative
evidence in the actual balancing process and in deciding whether to
exclude the evidence after the completion of the process.165
Regardless, both of these factors fall under the general heading of
probative value, especially when interpreted as meaning "need."'' 6
Furthermore, when an opponent does not plan to contradict the fact
for which the evidence is offered or volunteers to stipulate the fact,
the court may believe the opponent has less need for the evidence. 16
Thus, the court may also view admission of the evidence as a waste of
time because other means of proof are available.16
The Court in Old Chief adopted a contextual approach to
probative value.69 In accordance with commentators' views, 170
162. See Dolan, supra note 10, at 233-34. In addition, Professor Dolan defines
probative value as the "measurement of the degree to which the evidence persuades the
trier of fact that the particular fact exists and the distance of the particular fact from the
ultimate issues of the case." Id at 233.
163. 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 5214, at 269.
164. See 22 id.; see also Gold, supra note 107, at 74 (noting that the predominant
definition of probative value indicates that "it is a product of the logical implications of
evidence that can be totaled almost like a column of numbers"). In order to determine
the need, or probative value, the trial judge must consider the evidence being offered in
the larger context of all evidence presented in the case. See 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM,
supra note 12, § 5214, at 273.
165. See 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 5222, at 311.
166. See 22 L However, Professors Wright and Graham are careful to point out that
the hypertechnical distinction may be too difficult to enforce in practice under Rule 403.
See 22 id.
167. See 22 icL at 313.
168. See 22 id; see also Dolan, supra note 10, at 250-51 (noting that the availability of
other probative evidence of the same fact is a relevant factor to aid in determining
whether to exclude prejudicial evidence). Professor Dolan also recognizes the probative
value of a stipulation. See Dolan, supra note 10, at 252.
169. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 652.
170. See, e.g., Gold, supra note 107, at 75. Professor Gold, after succinctly describing
the value of evidence as "its usefulness in the context within which it is offered," Id at 74,
explains that the context encompasses "[a]mong other things, the presence of other
evidence that establishes the disputed fact, the relative strength of the offeror's case, the
difficulty of proving the fact in question, the importance of the fact in the offeror's case,
and the evidence offered by the opponent," id at 75 (footnotes omitted); see also supra
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Justice Souter, writing for the majority, described the probative value
of an item offered for evidence in terms of the availability of
alternative means of proof.171 However, Justice Souter's reference to
the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 404(b) is somewhat ironic.
He noted that the Advisory Committee's Note provided "'[n]o
mechanical solution"' when the evidence in question supported an
element of the offense, but, if admitted, would also constitute
illegitimate character evidence.'7 In such cases, a "'determination
must be made whether the danger of undue prejudice outweighs the
probative value of the evidence in view of the availability of other
means of proof and other facts appropriate for making decision[s] of
this kind under [Rule] 403.' 173 Justice Souter therefore concluded
that the trial judge's discretionary judgment turns not only on an
assessment of the probative value and the danger of unfair prejudice
that a piece of evidence presents, but also on putting the outcome of
that evaluation beside other similar evaluations of the alternative
evidence.174 Thus, while he noted the absence of a mechanical
solution under Rule 403, Justice Souter seemingly contradicted
himself by creating one through the establishment of a new general
rule in the majority's holding.75
After addressing the probative value of the stipulation according
to the context of the case, the Court essentially characterized "unfair
prejudice" in terms of emotion." The Court defined "unfair
prejudice" as the capability of relevant evidence to draw the
factfinder into determining guilt on a basis that differs from the proof
specific to the charged offense.'" Additionally, it quoted the
explanation of "unfair prejudice" in the Advisory Committee's Note,
note 61 and accompanying text (citing other authority advocating a contextual approach
to an assessment of probative value under Rule 403).
171. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 652.
172. I- (quoting FED. R. EviD. 404(b) advisory committee's note).
173. Id (misquoting FED. R. EvID. 404(b) advisory committee's note, substituting
"facts" for "factors"). But see id. at 657 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that Rule
404(b) does not apply); infra note 180 (discussing Justice O'Connor's dissenting view that
Rule 404(b) does not apply to Old Chief).
174. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 652; 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 63, at 782 & n.41; 22
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 5250, at 546-47.
175. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 655-56.
176. See d. at 650-52. After determining the initial relevancy and admissibility of the
prior-conviction evidence under Rules 401 and 402, the Court moved into a discussion of
"unfair prejudice," because Old Chief's argument centered around the phrase. See i. at
649-50. Although the Court immediately began the balancing process, it later defined
"probative value" in terms of need and in the context of available alternatives. See hi. at
651-52; supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's analysis).
177. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 650.
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which describes it as the "'undue tendency to suggest decision on an
improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional
one.' "178 The Court recognized the existence of such an "improper
basis" in Old Chief,179 under which it feared that the jury generalized
the defendant's earlier conviction into bad character evidence, thus
engaging in a chain of bad character reasoning or possibly deciding to
punish him on the basis of his prior conviction. 80
Although the Court found that the danger of unfair prejudice
outweighed the probative value of the evidence, it failed to consider
other aspects of unfair prejudice. While the Court in Old Chief
followed the Advisory Committee's Note by recognizing emotion as
a basis for unfair prejudice, it may be that "[e]quating all emotion
with prejudice is erroneous.' 18' Because emotion may promote
accuracy in fact-finding by incorporating the human factor into the
legal reasoning process, it helps to effectuate the real merit behind
the jury system.'8 In contrast to the Court's approach, unfair
prejudice can be measured as well by considering "the extent to
which an inferential error will detract from the goal of accurate fact-
178. Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note). Unlike the vague
reference to "need" given in association with probative value, the Advisory Committee's
Note to Rule 403 actually defines "unfair prejudice." See FED. R. EvID. 403 advisory
committee's note.
179. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 650 (recognizing the "improper grounds" as
"generalizing a defendant's earlier bad act into bad character and taking that as raising
the odds that he did the later bad act now charged").
180. See id. The Court further discussed the dangers of "propensity evidence" and the
serious likelihood that it will unfairly prejudice a criminal defendant. See id. (citing
United States v. Moccia, 681 F.2d 61, 63 (1st Cir. 1982)). The Court thus concluded that
propensity is an "improper basis" for conviction and that prior-conviction evidence falls
under Rule 403 analysis for a determination of relative probative value and prejudicial
risk of abuse as propensity evidence. See id. at 650-51. However, the dissent claimed that
Rule 404(b) does not preclude admission of prior-conviction evidence because under
§ 922(g)(1), the prosecution does not offer evidence of a prior felony conviction to prove
a defendant's bad character or to "'show action in conformity therewith.'" Id. at 657
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 404(b)). Instead, the prosecution
merely introduces the evidence of a prior felony conviction as direct proof of an essential
element of the charged offense. See i&L (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Thus, Justice
O'Connor argued that the majority "misread[] the Rules of Evidence and defie[d]
common sense." d. at 657-58 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
181. Gold, supra note 107, at 79.
182. See id.; see also Gold, supra note 7, at 503-04 (noting the same considerations in a
previous article and claiming that the detection of unfair prejudice directs emphasis to the
"end product of the prejudice"). Professor Gold also reasons that if probative value
pertains to the ability of evidence to yield a judgment grounded in correct fact-finding,
unfair prejudice relates to the ability of evidence to undermine this particular aim. See id.
See generally 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 5215, at 275 (discussing the
Advisory Committee's Note and its unfortunate reference to emotion, since fairness, as a
goal of the rule, does not eliminate all reliance on feeling).
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finding, and the likelihood the jury will commit such an error.' 1s
Furthermore, in the context of Rule 403, prejudice may not merely
refer to an appeal to emotion."8 Rather, prejudice may occur when
facts cause the jurors to base their decision on feelings, such as
hostility or sympathy, and to disregard the probative worth of the
evidence presented."'
Providing even more insight into the workings of unfair
prejudice, the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 403 also suggests
that the likely effectiveness or ineffectiveness of a limiting instruction
to the jury is another important consideration in determining
whether to exclude evidence on the basis of undue prejudice.186 In
her dissent in Old Chief, Justice O'Connor stated that an effective
limiting instruction mitigates "[a]ny incremental harm resulting from
proving the name or the basic nature of the prior felony."'8 In
addition, Justice O'Connor further asserted that efficient limiting
183. Gold, supra note 107, at 84. Also, like probative value, the danger of unfair
prejudice ought to be weighed according to the context in which the evidence is proffered.
See U; see also LEONARD, supra note 159, § 1.9.2, at 1:55-56 (quoting Gold, supra note
107, at 73).
184. See 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 63, at 780; 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note
12, § 5215, at 275. Professors Wright and Graham elaborate on the meaning of
"prejudice" by suggesting that courts refer to Wigmore's definition of "undue prejudice":
"Whenever the admission of a particular class of relevant evidential facts would
(1) be likely to stimulate an excessive emotion or to awaken a fixed prejudice as
to a particular subject or person involved in the issues, (2) and thus dominate the
mind of the tribunal and prevent a rational determination of the truth, (3) and
where the evidence having this tendency is not necessary to the ascertainment of
the truth .... 
22 id at 278 (quoting JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, CODE OF EvIDENCE 355 (3d ed. 1942));
see also Dolan, supra note 10, at 238 (asserting that prejudice occurs when evidence
appeals "to irrationality or emotion").
185. See 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 63, at 780. Professor McCormick also noted that
evidence of prior crimes "may lead a juror to think that since the defendant already has a
criminal record, an erroneous conviction would not be quite as serious as would otherwise
be the case." 1 Id.
186. See FED. R EviD. 403 advisory committee's note; see also 1 SALTzBURG &
MARTIN, supra note 113, at 160 (stating that in balancing under Rule 403, the trial judge
ought to take into account whether a limiting instruction offers adequate protection
against the danger of unfair prejudice if the evidence is admitted); 22 WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 5222, at 311 (restating that the trial court may consider the
effectiveness of a limiting instruction when determining unfair prejudice).
187. Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 658 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor relied
on Federal Rule of Evidence 105, which permits restricting evidence and instructing the
jury accordingly when evidence is admissible for one reason but inadmissible for another
reason. See Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also FED. R. EVID. 105 ("When evidence
which is admissible ... for one purpose but not admissible ... for another purpose is
admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and
instruct the jury accordingly.").
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instructions cure or alleviate the prejudice created by admitting
detailed evidence of a defendant's prior conviction.' Although
Justice O'Connor did not question the jury's adherence to limiting
instructions, she ignored the questionable effectiveness of a limiting
instruction under Rule 403.189 Thus, Justice O'Connor did not
recognize that while passions may not be running high in a
§ 922(g)(1) case, "[e]ven when passions are low, not everyone can
follow jury instructions."'" Nevertheless, in spite of their own
awareness of the shortcomings of limiting instructions,19 1 a great
number of courts use cautionary instructions as "talismans for the
solution of any possible prejudice problem." 92 Justice O'Connor's
argument for the use of limiting instructions implies that they are a
magical solution to a material problem, and in doing so, she fails to
justify or to remedy the likelihood of unfair prejudice that will result
from admitting evidence on the nature of a prior conviction.
Although the Court's analysis did not expressly recognize all of
these differing views of unfair prejudice, its failure to do so does not
detract from its opinion. All of these definitions entail emotion to
some degree, and thus in one way or another recognize the
quintessential role of emotion in the exercise of Rule 403. To ask the
members of the jury to ignore their emotions in the process of
rendering a verdict defies human nature.' While the jury's emotions
18& See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 658 (O'Connor, 3., dissenting). The majority did not
address whether a limiting instruction effectively mitigates the risk of unfair prejudice,
despite the reference to limiting instructions in the Advisory Committee's Note. See FED
R. EviD. 403 advisory committee's note (stating that the likely effectiveness or
ineffectiveness of a limiting instruction is a consideration for the court under Rule 403);
see also 1 SALTZBURG & MARTIN, supra note 113, at 160 (noting that the possibility of a
limiting instruction is a factor in the balancing test under Rule 403).
189. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 658 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Richman,
supra note 157, at 948 n.33 (noting that the Court's decision in Old Chief illustrates
skepticism of the effectiveness of limiting instructions).
190. Dolan, supra note 10, at 249. Professor Dolan notes that in a case involving Rule
403, the court determines that an item offered for evidence conveys "negative
connotations," and should therefore "immediately raise heightened suspicion about the
evidence, particularly if the prohibited effect is unfair prejudice." Id. at 248-49.
191. See id Professor Dolan characterizes the problematic effects of limiting
instructions by noting that despite the need for heightened sensitivity by the court under
issues involving Rule 403, many courts assume that juries comply with limiting
instructions, while law professors and others simply wink at the fiction. See i& at 248; see
also Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440,453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("The
naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury all
practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction." (citation omitted)).
192. Dolan, supra note 10, at 249.
193. Cf. 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 5215, at 276-78 (noting that
emotion plays a proper role so long as it does not exclude the operation of all logic);
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must not be the sole basis for its decision, and the evidence should
not unduly incite it, 94 the trial process, which incorporates the jury's
role, does not operate devoid of all emotion.195 Therefore, even
though the Court did not note all of the different descriptions of
unfair prejudice, its opinion recognized the essence of the phrase. 96
In her dissent in Old Chief, Justice O'Connor pointed to the
precise wording of Rule 403 to go beyond the majority's emphasis on
the emotional aspect of unfair prejudice. 97 In accordance with the
view that prejudice does not equate with the sheer harm done to one
party's case,198 Justice O'Connor countered the majority's holding by
noting that all evidence has the tendency to be prejudicial. 99 For this
reason, Justice O'Connor asserted, Rule 403 requires that the danger
of prejudice be "unfair," so that even though the prosecution's
evidence may be prejudicial and thus damage the defendant's case,
mere harm does not necessitate excluding the prosecution's relevant
evidence.2°° However, even a determination of unfairness would
seem to hinge on emotion?"' Thus, in the limited setting of
§ 922(g)(1), the majority's reasoning proves more persuasive than
Dolan, supra note 10, at 226-28 (arguing that jurors cannot ignore evidence of prior
convictions, and thus human nature requires withholding information).
194. See 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 63, at 780.
195. The Court noted that members of a jury approach a trial with certain
expectations. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 654. While the Court did not specifically refer
to any emotional expectations, it noted that the expectations may stem from the totality
of the human experience. See id. ("[B]eyond the power of conventional evidence to
support allegations and give life to the moral underpinnings of law's claims, there lies the
need for evidence in all its particularity to satisfy the jurors' expectations about what
proper proof should be."); see also Saltzburg, supra note 2, at 1019 (noting that jurors may
punish the party who fails to meet their expectations by making negative inferences
against that party); supra note 157 (discussing Professor Saltzburg's argument and the
expectations of jurors).
196. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 650.
197. See UdL at 656 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
198. See 1 McCORMICK, supra note 63, at 780; see also 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra
note 12, § 5215, at 274-75 (defining "prejudice" not as harm to the other party's case that
occurs due to the "legitimate probative force of the evidence; rather, it refers to the unfair
advantage that results from the capacity of the evidence to persuade by illegitimate
means" (emphasis added)); Dolan, supra note 10, at 238 (claiming that prejudice does not
refer to all evidence that proves detrimental to the case of the party seeking to preclude
the admission of the evidence).
199. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 656 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (" 'Virtually all
evidence is prejudicial or it isn't material. The prejudice must be "unfair."' " (quoting
Dollar v. Long Mfg., N.C., Inc., 561 F.2d 613,618 (5th Cir. 1977))).
200. See U (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
201. See, e.g., Dolan, supra note 210, at 236-37 (noting that Rule 403 entails numerous
subjective decisions); see also infra note 211 (quoting Professor Dolan's view on the
subjective nature of Rule 403).
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Justice O'Connor's claim that the prejudicial details of a prior
conviction carried no unfairness. The prosecution offered the record
of Old Chief's prior conviction for assault resulting in serious bodily
injury as direct proof of an essential element under § 922(g)(1),M and
while Justice O'Connor admitted the potential prejudicial nature of
this evidence, she nevertheless refused to view its admissibility as
unfair. o3
While the Old Chief Court did not define "substantially
outweighed,"2 the term has various interpretations. For example,
one view proposes that the requirement shows the drafters'
realization of the difficulty, and often the impossibility, of confidently
determining that the "potential for probative value outweighs the
potential for unfair prejudice, or vice versa."215 The directive
language also makes evident that the exclusion of evidence is an
extreme solution to be arrived at after considering whether other
means may adequately diminish the danger of prejudice. In
contrast, a more limited approach to the phrase "substantially
outweighed" suggests that because Rule 403 entails numerous
decisions based on the discretion of the trial judge, the words
represent "little more than gentle admonitions" to the trial judge.m
Furthermore, the requirement affects the discretion of the trial court
by creating a condition precedent-that the danger outweighs the
value-before the discretion to exclude even exists.2 The words
202. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 656 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
203. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note
12, § 5215, at 275 (noting that it is "somewhat ironic that 'fairness'-a concept dripping
with emotive content-should be invoked to bar other forms of sentiment"). Professors
Wright and Graham further assert that it would be "unfortunate indeed if Rule 403 is to
be based on the flawed conception of justice as an affair of the head and not of the heart.
Most citizens would be appalled to discover that ... 'human feeling and sentiment' are
out of place in the courtroom." 22 U (footnote omitted). They define fairness not as a
concept that pits emotion against reason, but rather as one that joins intellect and
emotion in order to "weed[] out inhuman logic and infamous sentiments." 22 ia
204. Perhaps the Court failed to address the meaning of the term because the
Advisory Committee's Note offers no explanation. See FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory
committee's note.
205. Gold, supra note 107, at 94. Professor Gold further notes that "the word
'substantially' does not relieve the court of the need to search for unfair prejudice and
does not resolve all hard cases in favor of admissibility... [but] merely confirms that the
burden of proof is on the person objecting to the evidence." IM Nevertheless, Professor
Gold submits that under this interpretation, Rule 403 favors admissibility because
whether the disputed evidence will necessarily prove harmful is not evident. See IU
206. See 1 WIGMORE, supra note 118, § 10a, at 680.
207. Dolan, supra note 10, at 236-37. Professor Dolan additionally notes that the
phrase fails to establish any reliable standards for review. See d. at 237.
208. See 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 5221, at 309-10.
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then necessitate a "significant tipping of the scales" before the judge
can actually exercise discretion to exclude the prejudicial evidence.209
While the Court's extensive analysis under Rule 403 illustrates the
difficulty of determining whether the risk of unfair prejudice
substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence, its
decision suggests the extreme solution of exclusion.2 10
The discrepancy between the majority and dissenting opinions
concerning the terms of Rule 403 illustrates the unavoidably
subjective character of the rule that arises from its grant of discretion
to the trial judge 1  The language of Rule 403 implicitly recognizes
the prejudicial quality of most evidence by requiring that the danger
of unfair prejudice be substantially outweighed by the probative value
of the evidence. Unfairness may arise when evidence has the
potential to cause the jury to rely on "something other than the
established propositions in the case. 213 While Rule 403 accords the
trial judge much latitude in weighing the probative value of the
evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice, it does not rule out
abuse of the broad allowance of discretion.2 4 Thus, the appellate
court may reverse the trial judge's ruling when the trial judge abuses
this discretion or refuses to exercise it.2t Despite the temptation for
209. 22 ild.
210. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 655.
211. See Dolan, supra note 10, at 236-37 ("The prejudice rule involves so many
subjective decisions by the judge that both tests [whether the probative value outweighs
or substantially outweighs the risk of unfair prejudice] represent little more than gentle
admonitions to trial courts rather than firm standards of review.").
212. See 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 106, § 403.04[1][a], at 30-31 ("Prejudice
alone is not sufficient to warrant exclusion under Rule 403. Virtually all evidence is
prejudicial to one party or another. To justify exclusion under Rule 403, the prejudice
must be unfair." (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)).
213. 2 id § 403.04[1][b], at 33. The authors identify evidence that incites the "instinct
to punish" as an example. 2 id § 403.04[1][c], at 36,38.
214. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 647 n.1 (citing United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45,54-55
(1984), as establishing the abuse of discretion standard for review of evidentiary rulings);
1 MCCORMICK, supra note 63, at 783; 1 WIGMORE, supra note 118, § 10a, at 680. The
appellate court will not reverse the trial court unless it finds an abuse of discretion. See 2
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 106, § 403.03, at 27-28; 1 WIGMORE, supra note 118,
§ 10a, at 681. Also, the discretion applies to the evaluation of probative value and unfair
prejudice, to the balancing of these aspects, and to the court's actual decision to exclude
or to admit the evidence based on its analysis. See 1 WIGMORE, supra note 118, § 10a, at
682. However, "[c]onstitutional considerations and general considerations of policy
suggest that exclusion of evidence on the ground of undue prejudice must be more
cautiously and rarely done." 1 id at 682-83 (footnote omitted).
215. See 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 5212, at 252. Furthermore, because
any conferral of discretion brings a restricted immunity from appellate review, the issue
on review goes to the degree of discretion granted under Rule 403. See 22 a Moreover,
Professors Wright and Graham view discretion as "a tool for change in legal rules" and
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the reviewing court to indulge in hindsight, the reviewing court
should analyze the lower court's decision from the perspective of the
lower court at the time it ruled.2 16 However, even though the
judgment of whether the evidence's probative value substantially
outweighs its unfair prejudice occurs at the trial court level, the
subjectivity and discretionary nature of the rule make engaging in
hindsight seem inevitable.
Against the somewhat unsettled background of Rule 403, the
Court in Old Chief determined the scope of the trial judge's
discretion when a defendant offers to stipulate his status as a prior
felon under § 922(g)(1).2 17 As a general rule, the prosecution has the
choice of what admissible evidence it will use to prove its case.2 "
Thus, a criminal defendant cannot use a stipulation as a means to
deny the prosecution the complete power of its evidence. 19
Reasoning that the trial judge's exclusion of the evidence and
acceptance of the stipulation will diminish their case, prosecutors
often insist that they have the right to take advantage of the full
evidentiary weight of the admissible evidence. They further
contend that they do not have to settle for less by accepting a mere
stipulation that is unlikely to arouse any emotion or feeling in the
jury.221
suggest "judicial creativity and the need for choice where rules cannot account for all of
the relevant factors." 22 id at 255 (footnote omitted). While some commentators assert
that the trial judge's decision under Rule 403 is essentially unreviewable and appellate
courts defer greatly to the trial judge's ruling, reversal for abuse of discretion is not
unknown. See 22 id § 5224, at 323.
216. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 651 n.6; cf Mengler, supra note 5, at 415 (asserting
that the task of the reviewing court is "solely to check the overall fairness of a trial, not to
fine-tune the Federal Rules, and in the process, undermine their flexibility through
binding precedents").
217. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 650.
21& See Parr v. United States, 255 F.2d 86,88 (5th Cir. 1958).
219. See id. A party has the right to paint a picture of the happenings that it depends
on to develop its case, and a denial of the right by way of substituting a stipulation may
adversely affect the potential strength of the evidence. See id; see also Old Chief, 117 S.
Ct. at 653 (quoting Parr in its recognition of the standard rule that a criminal defendant
cannot use a stipulation to circumvent the evidentiary impact of the prosecution's case);
id at 658-59 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing the Court's disavowal of the general
rule that the prosecution in a criminal case may choose how to prove its case); supra notes
95-105 and accompanying text (reviewing Justice O'Connor's arguments for adhering to
the general rule that permits prosecutors broad prosecutorial discretion in proving their
case).
220. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Right to "Plead Out" Issues and Block the
Admission of Prejudicial Evidence: The Differential Treatment of Civil Litigants and the




While some federal courts support the prosecution's argument
and do not force prosecutors to accept defendants' stipulations,M the
justifications behind the rulings are not readily apparent.
Moreover, when the defense volunteers to make a complete and
unqualified stipulation to a disputed issue, "there is an 'utter absence
of a legitimate state interest' justifying the rejection of the offer. The
introduction of evidence is a means to the end. The only legitimate
purpose for introducing evidence is to prove the ultimate, historical
propositions disputed between the parties."' m Furthermore, trial
courts should usually accept offers to stipulate, especially if the
stipulations will depreciate the prejudicial nature of the evidence.P
Prior to Old Chief, however, few judges would refuse the
prosecution the opportunity to tell the jury, either by way of proof or
stipulation, that a defendant was a prior felon when a defendant's
felony status constituted an essential element of the crime charged.22
Due to the Court's ruling in Old Chief, though, trial judges no longer
have the discretion to decide whether the prosecution must accept a
defendant's offer to stipulate prior felon status in cases under
§ 922(g)(1).P The Court in Old Chief recognized that the
defendant's offer to stipulate constituted a proposal to admit the
essential element of a prior felony conviction,22 and consequently the
222. See supra notes 123,131-39 and accompanying text.
223. See 22 WRIGI-rr & GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 5194, at 198-99. For example, due
to the general rule that the prosecution does not have to accept a defendant's stipulation
if doing so would harm the effectiveness of its case, a number of cases involving
stipulations offered by the defense may illustrate only that the proposed stipulation was
inadequate. See 22 iL at 199. Although the stipulations themselves may be lacking in
some form, the court should view the defendant's proffered stipulation as one factor in
the balancing process under Rule 403, in which the court may, in the exercise of its
discretion, exclude relevant evidence. See 22 id. Under Rule 403, if the probative value
of the evidence substantially outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice, the admission of
the evidence may be appropriate in some circumstances, even if the litigant against whom
the evidence is offered agreed to accept the stipulation, because the stipulation may not
carry equal probative force. See 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 106, § 403.04[3], at
44.
224. Imwinkelried, supra note 220, at 376 (quoting Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S.
422, 447 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)); see also Dolan, supra note 10, at 252 (noting
that a stipulation ought to be viewed as equivalent to other evidence and thus a litigant
ought not to be permitted to introduce prejudicial evidence on a matter not disputed).
225. See 2 WEINsTEIn & BERGER, supra note 106, § 403.04[3], at 45.
226. See Saltzburg, supra note 130, at 33.
227. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 655. Thus, if trial judges refuse to force the
prosecution to accept a defendant's stipulation of prior felony status under § 922(g)(1),
they will have abused their generally broad discretion under Rule 403. See id. at 655-56;
see also supra note 128 (discussing the distinction between a stipulation to the entire
prior-conviction element and one to the fact of felony status).
228. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 653.
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stipulation was not only "good evidence[,J ... but seemingly
conclusive evidence of the element."'229
Justice O'Connor intimated that the trial court should retain its
broad discretion under Rule 403, and thus disagreed with the
majority's view that a stipulation constituted conclusive proof. °
However, her argument failed to clarify specifically whether she
meant a stipulation to the entire element of prior conviction or to the
fact of prior conviction. The distinction is crucial,231 and her
references throughout her dissent confuse the issue.z2 Indeed, as a
consequence of the heavy burden of proof borne by the prosecution
in a criminal trial, the prosecution must have considerable latitude to
offer its choice of evidence to prove its case, 3 but Old Chief does not
remove the entire element of a prior felony conviction from the jury's
consideration.P Rather, it only precludes the jury from learning the
details of a defendant's prior conviction.235 In spite of the wide
margin of choice Justice O'Connor strongly advocated and the
serious concerns she raised in dissent, the majority's holding in effect
denies the prosecution any option in choosing evidence to prove
prior felony conviction status in cases under § 922(g)(1) when the
defendant offers to stipulate the same.
Because of the potential for abuse, appellate courts often urge
trial judges to record the rationale behind their decisions to exclude
229. Id (citation omitted). The Court referred to Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2)(A) to support its conclusion that the proffered stipulation was competent
evidence, not hearsay. See U Rule 801(d)(2)(A) excludes from the definition of hearsay
a statement that is offered against a party if it is the statement of that party. See FED R.
EvID. 801(d)(2)(A) (amended 1997).
230. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 656, 659 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
231. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction between
a stipulation to the entire prior-conviction element and one to the fact of felony status and
reviewing cases that relied on that distinction).
232. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 656, 659 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Early in her
dissent, Justice O'Connor stated that she did not agree with the majority's decision that a
defendant charged under § 922(g)(1) can require the prosecution "to accept his
concession to the prior conviction element of that offense." Id. at 656 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added). She later concluded from her discussion of the
prosecution's constitutionally required burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that "a
defendant's stipulation to an element of an offense does not remove that element from
the jury's consideration." IAl at 659 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 98-
102 and accompanying text (discussing Justice O'Connor's dissent).
233. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 659-60 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
234. See id. at 647,655-56.
235. See id. at 655 ("The issue is not whether concrete details of the prior crime should
come to the jurors' attention but whether the name or general character of that crime is
to be disclosed."); see also supra note 128 (discussing the distinction between a stipulation
to the entire prior-conviction element and one to the fact of felony status).
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evidence under Rule 403.W However, the subjective nature and
flexibility afforded in the exercise of discretion do not seem
conducive to recordation. Trial judges must have considerable
discretion to act in balancing evidence under Rule 4 0 3 237 because they
are the ones who see the action firsthand.28 Therefore, even if a trial
judge recorded any of the possibly numerous reasons behind the
discretionary determination, the written word cannot convey to the
appellate court every detail of the trial or the richness of the context
in which the decision took place. The trial court in Old Chief neither
applied Rule 403 nor wrote an opinion, and thus the reviewing courts
had no record upon which to base their analysis of the lower court's
procedure. The Supreme Court's ruling, however, obviates the need
for the trial court to explain its rationale.19 Because the trial court
no longer has the discretionary authority to exclude the name and
nature of a defendant's prior conviction in § 922(g)(1) cases, it need
not worry about the discernment of its reasoning.
In recognizing the name and nature of the defendant's prior
conviction as inadmissible, ° Old Chief bolsters the scant legislative
history of § 922(g). The statutory language creates a broad, general
category of persons who have "been convicted in any court of, [sic] a
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year."'41
However, Congress specifically excluded certain crimes from this
general category.242 Congress's main concern in enacting § 922(g)
was "to keep firearms out of the hands of criminals."' 3 Furthermore,
236. See 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 63, at 783-84; 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra
note 106, § 403.03, at 28; 1 WIGMORE, supra note 118, § 10a, at 685. Recordation may
help fight assertions that the trial court acted arbitrarily in its exercise of discretion under
Rule 403. However, those who advocate the grant of broad discretion to the trial judge
claim that the decisions under Rule 403 entail numerous indescribable and subjective
elements. See 1 WIGMORE, supra note 118, § 10a, at 685.
237. See United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 54 (1984) (stating that the trial judge "is
accorded a wide discretion" in assessing admissibility under Rules 401 and 403).
238. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 651 n.6. The Court noted the importance of reviewing
the trial court's ruling from the perspective of when the trial court had to make the
evidentiary ruling and "not indulg[ing] in review by hindsight." Id.
239. The Court did not expressly state that trial courts should or should not record
their reasoning, but the Court's holding makes the recordation irrelevant because it
effectively removed the trial court's discretion by creating a general rule. See id. at 655-
56.
240. See id at 653.
241. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1994).
242. See id. § 921(a)(20); see also supra note 28 (quoting § 921(a)(20), which excludes
certain crimes from the purview of § 922(g)(1)).
243. H.R. REP. No. 99-495, at 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1327, 1329.
Another concern was the impact of the statute as enforced against sportsmen and firearm
owners and dealers. See id,
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courts have also affirmed that Congress intended to prohibit firearm
possession by felons, 2  or persons it considers unreliable?. 5
Given that the Court was operating within such a broad
framework, it had considerable leeway in interpreting the general
statutory language of § 922(g)(1). The Court appropriately
recognized that the specific language of § 922(g)(1) reveals no
express congressional concern about the name or the nature of the
prior felony conviction, other than the bare minimum required under
the broad classification. 2" Therefore, by placing Old Chief in the
general category of prior felons as called for under the statute, his
proposed stipulation satisfied the requisite elementU 7 Thus, the
stipulation rendered the specific name and the exact nature of his
prior felony conviction irrelevant under the statute.24
While Justice O'Connor disagreed with the majority's
interpretation of the statutory classification, her argument
unnecessarily went beyond the plain language of the statute.249 Upon
close inspection, Justice O'Connor's claim that the statutory structure
clearly evidences Congress's intent that the jury learn the name and
nature of a defendant's prior conviction appears lacking. She
contended that Congress, by excluding certain crimes, did not mean
to make the word "crime" an "abstract or metaphysical concept"; 1
244. See United States v. Carter, 981 F.2d 645,647 (2d Cir. 1992).
245. See United States v. Crochet, 788 F.2d 1061, 1062 (5th Cir. 1986); see also Barrett
v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 218 (1976) (stating that the purpose of the Gun Control
Act was to keep firearms from those Congress classified as "dangerous or potentially
irresponsible"); Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 824 (1974) (noting that
Congress intended to "curb crime by keeping firearms out of the hands of those not
legally entitled to possess[ion]"); Richman, supra note 157, at 941 (asserting that
Congress simply did not give much consideration to the expansive prohibition it created
in § 922(g)(1)).
246. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 653.
247. See i&L
248. See i. at 653,655.
249. Commentators have noted that courts have often struggled with the application of
the plain meaning rule. See, e.g., Arthur W. Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain
Meaning Rule" and Statutory Interpretation in the "Modem" Federal Courts, 75 COLUM.
L. REV. 1299, 1308 (1975) ("Mhe courts have no clear idea about what the plain meaning
rule is and, what is more, ... they really do not care."); see also Harry Willmer Jones, The
Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 25 WASH.
U. L.Q. 2, 23-24 (1939) (advocating the use of extrinsic evidence at the outset of
interpretation); cf. Cleary, supra note 1, at 911 (noting that under the plain meaning rule,
statutory text is "the prime source of meaning, to be read in such context as may be
relevant").
250. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (1994); see also supra note 28 (discussing the exclusion
of certain crimes).
251. Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 656 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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rather, crimes have names, and the prosecution must still prove that
the defendant committed a specific crime. However, the majority's
interpretation of the language did not make the prior crime an
"abstract or metaphysical concept."253 Instead, it merely removed the
unnecessary and potentially prejudicial qualities of the crime from
the jury's consideration upon the defendant's offer to stipulate the
fact of his prior conviction.
The Court's acceptance of the broad categorization under the
felon-in-possession statute may also curb prosecutorial discretion.2
The prosecution in Old Chief chose to charge the defendant with a
violation of § 922(g)(1) in addition to accusing him of assault with a
dangerous weapon and using or possessing a weapon during the
commission of a violent crime 55 Likewise, the prosecution chose not
to accept the defendant's stipulation of his prior-conviction statusP 6
While the prosecution did not have to seek the felon-in-possession
charge, its decision to do so is understandable because the statute's
mere existence illustrates at least some legislative support for the
conviction of felons in possession of firearms3P
In contrast, the prosecution's insistence that it did not have to
accept the proffered stipulation under the particular circumstances of
the case did not have any justifiable basis. 8 Because the stipulation
offered presumably conclusive proof of Old Chief's status as a prior
felon, it established an essential element of § 922(g)(1).P9 While the
Court's opinion did not speculate about the prosecution's motivation
behind its refusal to accept the stipulation, the details therein
nevertheless imply that the prosecution wanted to maximize the
conviction.3 Furthermore, one commentator even suggests that an
252. See id. at 656-57, 660 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
253. Id. at 656 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
254. See Richman, supra note 157, at 979 (advocating granting prosecutors "virtually
unaccountable discretion," but recognizing that the Court's decision in Old Chief limits
prosecutors' choices in felon-in-possession cases).
255. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 644.
256. See id. at 648.
257. See Richman, supra note 157, at 952-53.
258. Cf. id. at 941, 966 (recognizing both the need for accurate, precise information in
order to prevent juror speculation and the desire of prosecutors to maximize convictions).
Professor Richman's argument is certainly noteworthy, but the prosecution in Old Chief
did not show that its need substantially outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice. See
Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 654-55. The Court insisted that the need for evidentiary depth
essentially does not apply when a defendant's status is at issue. See d. at 654.
259. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 653.
260. See Richman, supra note 157, at 966-67. Furthermore, perhaps the prosecution in
Old Chief intended to prejudice the jury by introducing the name and nature of the
defendant's prior conviction. Prejudicial motive would appear likely because prosecutors
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increasing number of cases falling under Rule 403 show "the
persistence of lawyers, especially prosecutors, in attempting to load
the record with inflammatory information they hope will move the
jury." 126
While the Court in Old Chief recognized the harshness of
excluding evidence under Rule 403, it nevertheless held that when
proof of convict status is at issue, the trial court must not admit the
full record of conviction to prove the element of prior conviction.262
The Court carefully pointed out the limited nature of its holding, 63
yet it formulated a general rule for all cases "in which the prior
conviction is for an offense likely to support conviction on some
improper ground."'' Even if the Court has not invited other
arguments for excluding evidence under Rule 403, its decision
requiring absolute exclusion in a particular set of cases effectively
removes the trial judge's discretionary power.7
It is possible, however, to reconcile Old Chief with Rule 403 if a
distinction is made between the discretion of the trial court and the
discretion of the judiciary. While the Court held that the trial court
abused its discretion by refusing to accept Old Chief's stipulationm it
may nevertheless have acted in a manner wholly consistent with the
Federal Rules of Evidence. In establishing Rule 403, the drafters
meant to provide a rule to cover situations in which no specific rule
applied.2 67 In Old Chief, the Court has formulated a new rule that
applies in the narrow context of cases requiring proof of a
defendant's status as a felon.m Thus, the Court has used the
discretion that Rule 403 affords the judiciary generally to provide a
specific rule that negates a trial court's discretion in determining the
admissibility of prior convictions under the felon-in-possession
statute. 19
are seemingly aware that "[e]videntiary doctrine ... quite correctly fears that a jury will
be quicker to convict, or will at least have fewer regrets about convicting, when it learns
of a defendant's prior criminal record." Id. at 977; cf. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNITED
STATES ATrORNEYS' MANUAL 9-63.513, at 19 (1992) (directing that indictments
charging § 922(g)(1) violations be drafted in accordance with circuit precedent, and when
there is none, "in the manner most advantageous to the government").
261. Dolan, supra note 10, at 228.
262 See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 655-56.
263. See id at 651 n.7, 655.
264. IaL at 655.
265. See id at 656.
266. See id. at 647.
267. See FED. R. EvID. 403 advisory committee's note.
268. See Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 651 n.7.
269. See 22 WmGrr & GRAHAM, supra note 12, § 5212, at 250 (characterizing Rule
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Although the Court's holding under the case-specific
circumstances seems to promote truth and justice in Old Chief's own
case, it is questionable whether its interpretation of Rule 403 will
work similar benefits in every case arising under the new rule. The
drafters of Rule 403 intentionally included ambiguous phrases in
direct recognition of the inevitable need for judicial flexibility to
adapt to the facts of each particular case. Indeed, the Court took
advantage of the flexibility afforded by the rule to arrive at a just
result in Old Chief. However, if the "drafters intended that the
Federal Rules' generality and flexibility should perpetuate,"2' 0 the
Court's exercise in sound discretion has checked the original design.
KATHRYN CAMERON WALTON
403 as an attempt "to regularize and channel the use of discretion in the administration of
the rules of evidence"); see also 22 id at 255 (describing discretion as a "tool for change in
the legal rules").
270. Mengler, supra note 5, at 457.
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